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This study examined whether children’s truth- and lie-telling is perceived differently by 
adults when the children have mental illness labels (MIL). Participants (N = 432) read a vignette 
and watched a video from each of four veracity/motivation (i.e., prosocial truth, antisocial truth, 
prosocial lie, antisocial lie) and child label (i.e., control, ADHD, depression, asthma) conditions. 
After each video/vignette combination, participants rated their impressions of and responses 
towards the child. Participants also completed measures of their implicit and explicit attitudes 
towards mental illness. The results indicated participants had more negative perceptions of 
children they rated higher on dangerousness and lower on control. Children without mental 
illness labels were rated as more in control than children with mental illness labels. However, 
while diagnoses did impact perceptions of the children, they did not predict perceptions of their 
lie-telling, with one exception. Children labeled with depression who made antisocial statements 
were rated more negatively than children labeled with ADHD. Overall, participants rated 
children who made antisocial statements, told lies, and older children more negatively than 
children who made prosocial statements, told truths, and younger children. They rated antisocial 
lies worst and prosocial truths most positively, with antisocial truths and prosocial lies 
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equivalent. Participants with high implicit and explicit biases rated children with mental illness 
labels more negatively than participants with high implicit and low implicit biases and low 
explicit and implicit biases. However, participants with low implicit and explicit biases were 
unique in rating males more positively than females. Implications of these findings for future 
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History and culture are replete with famous instances of truth- and lie-telling, from 
popular references to “Honest Abe” to Bill Clinton’s “I did not have sexual relations with that 
woman.” Arguably, individuals’ decisions to tell a “truth” or “lie” are complicated by internal 
and external motivations, as well as conflicting interpretations of what a “truth” or “lie” is. In the 
case of lies, individuals communicate altered versions of reality to accomplish a goal. That goal 
might be to protect another, to protect oneself, to save face, or perhaps to obtain some kind of 
reward. While some might argue that a lie is a lie is a lie (Bok, 1978; DePaulo et al., 1996), most 
individuals acknowledge the motivation behind a lie greatly impacts how that lie is perceived by 
others (Jensen, Arnett, Feldman, & Cauffman, 2004). In fact, society actively encourages 
“polite” or “white” lies, which are told to be nice or to protect another individual (DePaulo & 
Jordan, 1982), in place of blunt honesty. In addition, society also accepts, if not actively 
encourages, the use of lying in employment situations (i.e., “This is my dream job.” or “I am 
fully committed to this company’s mission.”) (DePaulo et al., 1996).  
Similarly, individuals tell the truth, or at least their understanding of the truth, for various 
reasons. These reasons could range from a moral imperative, desire to hurt another (in the place 
of a polite lie), or to establish a common understanding (aka “ground truth”), among others. 
While truth-telling is often considered to be the default mode of communication between 
members of society (Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011), this is not always the case. In 
certain social situations, individuals are actively encouraged to tell a lie, rather than the truth, in 
order to protect another individual or group. In these situations, truth-telling may be reacted to 
negatively. One of the tasks for members of a society is to learn the social rules and conventions 
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surrounding truth- and lie-telling behavior and it is likely that the reactions and feedback from 
others is influential in this process (Brimbal & Crossman, 2016; Brimbal, Zottoli, & Crossman, 
2016). 
While the circumstances in which truth- and lie-telling occur have been previously 
investigated, as have perceptions of truths and lies, what is less clear is how individual 
characteristics of a truth- or lie-teller impact another’s perception of the truth- or lie-telling. 
Specifically, it is unknown how mental health labels, such as anxious, depressed, or 
schizophrenic, impact how a truth- or lie-teller is perceived. However, research on the tendency 
of stigmatized individuals to be discredited by society (Farina, 1998; Goffman, 1963) suggests 
that mental illness stigma may cause individuals to react differently towards truth- and lie-telling 
by individuals with mental health labels than those without.  
For example, when a child with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) tells a 
lie or a blunt (i.e., socially inappropriate) truth, the child may not receive the same feedback as a 
child without ADHD. Witnesses to the child’s truth/lie may expect the child with ADHD to be 
incapable of controlling their impulses long enough to learn and/or follow the societal rules 
surrounding truths and lies and, consequently, evaluate that behavior and the child less 
negatively than they might otherwise and refrain from correcting the child’s behavior. As a 
result, the child with ADHD may not be taught society’s conventions surrounding truth- and lie-
telling, which could put him at a further disadvantage when seeking employment or establishing 
mutual relationships in adulthood. Similarly, beliefs about a depressed child’s dangerousness – 
related to the increased prevalence of school shootings - might inhibit an adult from providing 
corrective feedback for their lie-telling or blunt truth-telling, but could potentially exacerbate a 
negative evaluation of the child and his behavior.  Thus, to the extent that children with mental 
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illness labels receive different feedback about truth- and lie-telling, it could put them at a 
disadvantage as adults when they encounter situations which require an understanding of 
society’s expectations around truth- and lie-telling. As mental health stigma has already been 
shown to negatively impact an individual’s employment prospects (Farina, 1998), relationships, 
and community involvement (Pescosolido, 2013), it is important to determine whether 
individuals with mental health labels are further disadvantaged due to receiving different 
socialization messages in regards to truth- and lie-telling.  
The goal of the current study is thus to begin addressing this previously unexplored issue 
– whether a child’s truth and lie-telling is perceived differently by adults when the child has a 
mental illness label.  In theory, such perceptions and an adult’s subsequent reactions could 
provide feedback (i.e., a source of socialization) that teaches children the social conventions 
surrounding this social behavior.  In order to explore this possibility, the following sections 
provide an overview of the existing literature in areas that have not, to this point, been combined 
by researchers. First, the socialization literature is reviewed, with a particular focus on the 
socialization of truth- and lie-telling and the socialization of stigma and prejudice. This is 
followed by an overview of research on mental illness stigma. The review concludes with the 
proposal of a theoretical model for how mental illness stigma might impact the socialization of 
children’s truth- and lie-telling. Informed by the proposed theoretical model, the final section 
states the research questions and hypotheses this study aims to examine and the study’s 









Socialization is broadly considered to be the process by which an individual learns the 
skills, behaviors, and values that will allow them to become functional members of society 
(Grusec & Hastings, 2014). However, the exact mechanisms by which this process takes place 
has been the focus of numerous academic debates throughout the last century. Initially, 
researchers were focused on creating a single, all-encompassing theory to explain the process of 
development (Collins, 2011; Maccoby, 1992). Although Lev Vygotsky (1978) was one of the 
first scientists to develop this type of universal theory through his writings on the influence of 
sociocultural factors on cognitive development, his early death and necessity of translating his 
works from Russian to English resulted in his ideas receiving little attention until the 1970’s 
(John-Steiner & Mahn, 1996).  
Jean Piaget (1936; 1952), a contemporary of Vygotsky, also developed a universal theory 
regarding the development of human intelligence. While not directly related to socialization, 
Piaget’s writings had a significant impact on the field of developmental psychology and later 
played an important role in the development of social learning theories. Piaget proposed a 
developmental stage theory, which conceptualized cognitive development as occurring through a 
process driven by biological maturation and environmental experience (1936; 1952). Key aspects 
of Piaget’s theory included the concepts of schemas, assimilation, and accommodation.  
Piaget considered schemas to be the basic building blocks of knowledge and to provide 
an individual with the ability to organize and use information from past experiences to inform 
future actions (1936; 1952). As a person matured, Piaget theorized they developed schemas in 
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greater numbers and of greater complexity. Piaget also saw intellectual growth as a form of 
adjustment to the world. Through accommodation (i.e., changing an existing schema to deal with 
a new situation) and assimilation (i.e., using an existing schema to deal with a new situation), an 
individual can incorporate new information into existing knowledge structures while continuing 
to progress in their cognitive development (Piaget, 1936; Piaget, 1952).  
Piaget’s stages of cognitive development are perhaps his most well-known contribution 
to the field of developmental psychology and have informed theories surrounding the cognitive 
prerequisites of lying behavior. He believed that all children go through the same four stages of 
cognitive development in the same order, though children may attain the stages at different rates 
or never attain later stages at all (Piaget, 1936; Piaget, 1952). In general, Piaget proposed 
children would achieve the sensorimotor stage between birth and two years of age. The primary 
achievement of the sensorimotor stage is object permanence – knowing an object is present, even 
if it is not visible to the naked eye. The second stage, preoperational, was thought to be achieved 
between the ages of two and seven. The primary achievement during this stage is the 
development of symbolic thinking (i.e., the ability to make a thing stand for something other than 
itself).  
Piaget termed the third stage the concrete operational stage and considered this stage to 
be a critical point in a child’s cognitive development. In the concrete operational stage, a child 
becomes capable of logical, or operational, thought, and understands the principle of 
conservation (i.e., something stays the same quantity, even though its appearance may change). 
Piaget believed this stage was generally achieved between the ages of seven and eleven. The 
final stage, formal operational, is believed to begin at age eleven and continue into adulthood. 
During this period, an individual becomes capable of understanding abstract concepts and 
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logically testing hypotheses. As noted below, socialization of children’s moral and deceptive 
behavior, which arguably rely on these cognitive abilities, is well underway by this age.  
Another contributor to early socialization theories was Urie Bronfenbrenner. 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) proposed an ecological systems model of child development which 
emphasized the role of a child and his/her environment (both proximal and distal) on their 
development. He identified five distinct ecological subsystems which guide and support 
development. The first layer, the microsystem, is comprised of the child’s relationships with 
structures he/she has direct contact with (i.e., parents, school, peers). The second layer, the 
mesosystem, provides a point of connection between the primary structures in a child’s 
microsystem (i.e., between a child’s parents and teachers).  
The third layer, the exosystem, involves the larger social system with which the child 
does not directly interact, but his/her microsystem structures do (i.e. parents’ work schedules, 
local politics). At this level, the child is not directly involved with the structures, but may be 
impacted by them either positively or negatively. The fourth layer, the macrosystem, is 
comprised of a society’s cultural values, customs, and laws. The final layer, the chronosystem, is 
concerned with the construct of time as it impacts the child, either externally (i.e., timing of a 
sibling’s birth) or internally (i.e., the aging process). Of note, these layers exist in a complex 
reciprocal interaction with each other, such that a child can influence their environment and be 
influenced by their environment simultaneously. This dynamic model is discussed more below 
with regard to children’s moral development. 
Despite Piaget’s, Vygotsky’s, and Bronfenbrenner’s significant contributions to 
psychology, their theories were not integrated into the socialization literature until well after their 
initial publications. Thus, early investigations into universal theories of socialization were driven 
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primarily by proponents of behaviorism and psychoanalytic theory – the two dominant schools 
of thought at the time (Collins, 2011; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). 
Universal theories. Psychoanalytic theory considered socialization to be the end result of 
parental practices and children’s inherent drives and impulses coming into conflict (Kagan, 
1982). As children were seen as being primarily driven by sexuality and aggression, it was the 
duty of the parent to bring the child’s impulses under social control (Grusec & Hastings, 2014; 
Maccoby, 1992). In addition, psychoanalysts viewed early childhood as a critical time period 
during which many core characteristics are permanently acquired, with parents, particularly 
mothers, considered the primary vehicles through which socialization occurred (Grusec & 
Hastings, 2014; Kagan, 1982; Maccoby, 1992).  
In contrast, behaviorists, led by B. F. Skinner, saw the child as a tabula rasa (blank slate) 
with none of the inherent drives and impulses perceived by psychoanalysts (Cairns & Cairns, 
2006; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Rather than viewing the events of early childhood as leading to 
permanent, irreversible character development, behaviorists strived to demonstrate that specific 
infant/child behaviors could be conditioned and extinguished at will (Collins, 2011; Watson, 
1913). In addition, behaviorists acknowledged that individuals other than parents could have an 
impact on a child’s socialization (i.e., teachers, peers) and that the process of socialization 
continued beyond the early childhood years (Cairns & Cairns, 2006; Collins, 2011). In sum, 
socialization was seen by behaviorists as merely another type of learning which occurred 
throughout the lifespan and was acquired from a number of sources (Collins, 2011; Grusec & 
Hastings, 2014; Kagan, 1982). However, it is important to note that both behaviorists and 
psychoanalysts saw parents as the primary conduits through which socialization occurred. 
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The next wave of researchers attempted to reconcile the two theories by translating 
psychoanalytic principles into behaviorist terms so that they could be studied (Collins, 2011; 
Grusec & Hastings, 2014). The concepts of reinforcement and punishment were used as the 
central antecedent mechanisms, while secondary drives were considered to develop out of 
biological needs (Collins, 2011; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). For example, to examine fixations 
during the early stages of development, researchers investigated the processes of weaning and 
toilet training using reinforcement and punishment (Maccoby, 1992). Unfortunately, the scope of 
the studies conducted during this period was rather narrow due to the limited focus of 
psychodynamic theories. That is, the studies generally focused on children’s aggression, desire 
for parental approval, toilet training, weaning, and other events occurring within the first 5 years 
of a child’s life (the critical years for personality formation according to psychoanalytic theory), 
and neglected to investigate broader areas of socialization, such as learning to share, acquisition 
of language, and the development of manners (Cairns & Cairns, 2006; Kagan, 1982; Maccoby, 
1992). Moreover, the results of these studies were largely unsuccessful and found little relation 
between the psychoanalytic concepts of interest and the parental practices manipulated using 
behaviorist principles (Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957). 
Domain specific theories. Following these unsuccessful efforts to develop and support 
one comprehensive theory of socialization, a number of influential theories aimed at explaining 
discrete domains of socialization emerged (Collins, 2011; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Of those, 
the most relevant are attachment theory, social learning theory, and guided learning theory. 
Derived from John Bowlby’s (1969) studies of non-human primates, attachment theory views the 
bond between parent and child as the result of an evolutionary instinct to create reciprocal 
behaviors in parent and child that will sustain the child’s development (Ainsworth & Bell, 1969; 
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Grusec & Hastings, 2014). At its core, the theory revolves around how a child learns to respond 
when threatened and the impact of that response style on various interpersonal relationships 
throughout their lifespan (Dykas & Cassidy, 2011; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Attachment 
theorists emphasize the importance of an infant’s relationship with their primary caregiver in 
shaping their attachment style. If an infant has a primary caregiver who does not respond to their 
needs, or responds inconsistently, the child can acquire an enduring maladaptive response style 
in relationships (Ainsworth, Bell, & Stayton, 1971; Bowlby, 1973; Marvin & Britner, 2008). 
However, it is important to note that while attachment theory emphasizes the importance of a 
primary caregiver in a child’s development, it fails to explain the exact mechanism through 
which the caregiver impacts the child’s socialization (Grusec & Hastings, 2014).  
In 1978, Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues created a classification system for the 
various types of attachment a child could demonstrate. A secure attachment style (i.e., infant is 
upset when caregiver leaves and happy upon their return) suggests the child is confident their 
caregiver will consistently respond appropriately to their needs (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Studies 
have demonstrated that children with secure attachment styles are more likely to have high self-
esteem, strong social support networks, and long-term, trusting adult relationships (Feeney & 
Noller, 1990; Simpson, 1980; Sroufe, 2005). Alternatively, a child can develop an insecure 
attachment style, of which three specific subtypes have been identified: anxious-resistant, 
anxious-avoidant, and disorganized (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Main & Solomon, 1986).  
An anxious-resistant attachment style (i.e., infant is extremely upset when caregiver 
leaves and is ambivalent upon their return) develops when caregivers unpredictably vacillate 
between responding to the child’s needs and ignoring the child’s needs (Ainsworth et al., 1978). 
This pattern of attachment is often found in abused children (McCarthy & Taylor, 1999). An 
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anxious-avoidant attachment style (i.e., child shows little emotion when caregiver departs or 
returns) develops when a caregiver is consistently unresponsive to a child’s needs (Ainsworth et 
al., 1978). The last type of insecure attachment style, disorganized attachment, was added to the 
classification system several years after the creation of Ainsworth’s initial classifications due to 
difficulty categorizing all infants into one of the three original attachment styles (Main & 
Solomon, 1986). Infants with a disorganized attachment style tend to show fear, a simultaneous 
display of contradictory emotions, or dissociation upon their caregiver’s return (Carlson, 
Cicchetti, Barnett, & Braunwald, 1989; Main & Solomon, 1990; Van Ijzendoorn, Schuengel, & 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1999). Children who have been placed in multiple foster homes at a 
young age often display this type of attachment (Crittenden & Landini, 2011). Overall, studies 
have found that children with insecure attachment styles are more likely to have difficulties 
regulating their emotions and behavior, establishing relationships, and developing a positive self-
image (Sroufe, 2005; Van Ijzendoorn, Schuengel, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1999).  
In contrast, social learning theory examines how children’s observational learning (i.e., 
learning through observing others) and group participation influence the socialization process 
(Bandura, 1977; Grusec & Davidov, 2010; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Rather than focusing on a 
single individual, such as the primary caregiver, social learning theory acknowledges 
socialization occurs through a variety of social interactions. The attachment between a child and 
caregiver is seen as merely a form of leverage the caregiver can use in their efforts to socialize 
the child and is not considered to be qualitatively different from the attachments a child can form 
with their peers or teachers (Bandura, 1965; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Albert Bandura (1977) 
demonstrated the concept of social learning in a classic experiment wherein children were asked 
to observe an adult modeling either aggressive or non-aggressive play. Bandura found the child’s 
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later play was directly impacted by their earlier observation of the adult. Children who observed 
the adult playing aggressively were significantly more likely to engage in aggressive behavior 
than children who were exposed to the non-aggressive model (Bandura, 1977). In short, Bandura 
determined that learning could take place solely through observation and without the presence of 
rewards or attachment.  
Later studies demonstrated that socialization through observational learning can be 
strengthened through the use of same-sex models and models with personal relationships with 
the participants (Grusec & Hastings, 2014; Perry & Bussey, 1979). In addition, anthropological 
and cultural research has shown a strong link between observational learning with the intent of 
participation at a later time and the socialization of cultural norms and values (Odden & Rochat, 
2005; Rogoff et al., 2007). While this can and does occur outside of the family unit, there is 
evidence that family traditions and routines are integral to a child developing a sense of social 
identity and belonging (Fiese et al., 2002; Wolin & Bennett, 1984).   
Lastly, guided learning theory emphasizes the importance of formal instruction by a more 
experienced individual as the mechanism by which culturally relevant skills and knowledge are 
transmitted (Vygotsky, 1978). The more experienced individual is expected to work within the 
child’s “zone of proximal development” by presenting them with material that is just beyond 
their current level of understanding (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1984). Also known as 
scaffolding, this process allows the child to slowly increase their level of understanding as it 
becomes developmentally appropriate. While the concept of guided learning has been primarily 
applied to cognitive functioning, there has been some limited research conducted applying 
guided learning theories to moral (Turner & Berkowitz, 2005), socioemotional (Laible & Panfile, 
2009), and physical (Exner, 1990) development. 
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Integrating theories. Drawing on prior domain specific theories of socialization, Grusec 
and Davidov (2010) developed a theory of socialization that integrates the theories discussed 
above, while accounting for their occasionally conflicting propositions (Figure 1). They propose 
there are five primary domains of socialization, with each domain representing a distinct 
socialization process and child outcome. In addition, their approach emphasizes the importance 
of the child’s role in their own socialization, consistent with Piaget’s theorizing, and the impact 
of cultural differences on the weight given to each domain, consistent with Vygotsky’s 










Figure 1. Integrative theory of socialization. This figure illustrates the five distinct domains of 
child socialization proposed by Grusec and Davidov (2010). 
The protection domain, drawing from attachment theory, is concerned with how a parent 
responds to a child’s distress. For example, studies have shown that parents who respond 









regulation (Cassidy, 1994), distress tolerance (Cassidy, 1994; Davidov & Grusec, 2006), 
empathy (Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 1998), and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1998) by the child. The second domain, reciprocity, involves parental response to a child’s 
reasonable requests. When the response is appropriate, research has shown it promotes 
cooperation and compliance by the child (Kochanska & Murray, 2000; Parpal & Maccoby, 
1985).  
The third domain, control, refers to the appropriate use of authority to alter a child’s 
behavior to conform to the socialization agent’s goals. While the manner in which this authority 
is appropriately exercised can vary depending on the parent/child relationship, it ideally leads to 
the internalization of moral and principled behavior by the child (Bugental & Grusec, 2006). 
However, this domain is particularly difficult to evaluate empirically due to the complexity of 
establishing definitions of what constitutes “appropriate” authority and “moral and principled 
behavior.” The most consistent finding in this domain is that the effectiveness of parental control 
strategies is dependent on a number of parent and child variables, such as temperament, sex, age, 
mood, and nature of the offense (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994).  
The guided learning domain involves the facilitation of a child’s cognitive, physical, 
vocational, social, and emotional skills with the goal of improving their ability to successfully 
navigate their cultural group. While there is limited research on the impact of guided learning on 
socialization, studies have supported the use of guided learning in related areas, such as 
acquiring socioemotional skills (Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1996; Laible, 2004; Laible & Song, 
2006), improving social interaction with peers (Leve & Fagot, 1997; Vandell & Wilson, 1987), 
and facilitating moral and character development (Turner & Berkowitz, 2005). The last domain, 
group participation, refers to the inclusion of children in social groups where they can learn 
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social customs, cultural practices, and group norms through observation and develop a social 
identity. Multiple studies have demonstrated the impact of observational learning, particularly 
observational learning with the intent to eventually participate, on the behavior and the 
acquisition of knowledge among children (Bandura, 1977; Fiese et al., 2002; Miller & Goodnow, 
1995; Rogoff et al., 2007).  
A typical individual is likely to be influenced by each of these domains numerous times 
throughout their life and, as a result, acquire the skills, behaviors, and values which indicate their 
affiliation with a specific society (Grusec & Davidov, 2010). It is through these domains, acting 
alone and in concert with one another, that an individual also develops morals, principles, 
prejudices, and standards of behavior (Grusec & Davidov, 2010). This paper looks specifically at 
the socialization of lying behavior, which appears to be influenced primarily by the group 
participation and control domains, and how other socialized values, such as stigma, can impact 
the socialization process. 
Socialization of Truth- and Lie-Telling 
To be fully socialized with regard to truth- and lie-telling, an individual must understand 
the purpose of truth- and lie-telling and the societal contexts in which truth- versus lie-telling is 
considered appropriate or inappropriate. As very little research to date has been conducted 
specifically on truth-telling (though see “A Note on Truth-Telling” below), this section focuses 
primarily on lie-telling. With regards to the purpose of lying, speech act theory provides a 
concise framework to understand children’s lying or deceptive behaviors (Austin, 1962; Lee, 
2013). It argues that verbal utterances serve both descriptive and intentional functions, and can 
serve as tools in accomplishing specific social objectives (Austin, 1962). In other words, speech 
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act theory considers lying to be the act of using words to deceive (Lee, 2000) and children must 
be socialized in how to do so (or not) appropriately. 
As is true for any type of speech, evaluation of the act of lie-telling involves 
consideration of both intentionality (i.e., mental state) and conventionality (i.e., social rules) 
from the perspective of both the lie-teller and the recipient (Lee, 2000; Lee, 2013). Accordingly, 
when studying lie-telling it is important to examine an individual’s motivation and their 
understanding of social norms in regards to lie-telling behavior. Since socialization occurs 
progressively throughout childhood, it is likely that children’s understand of lie-telling evolves 
and they alter their lie- and truth-telling behavior as they mature to more closely meet societal 
expectations (Bussey, 1999; Popliger, Talwar, & Crossman, 2011; Xu et al., 2010). For example, 
Bussey (1999) found that 4-year-olds had more difficultly correctly identifying lies and truths 
than older children (aged 8 and 11), particularly in the case of “white,” or prosocial, lies. These 
results suggest that as children mature they develop an understanding of the concept of prosocial 
lying, which they did not possess at a younger age. 
Researchers have identified two categories in which the majority of lies fall: prosocial 
lies and antisocial lies. Prosocial lies consist of “white” or “blue” lies, which are told to protect 
another individual (white) or the community (blue) (Barnes, 1994; Talwar & Lee, 2002). 
Antisocial lies are told in order to protect the lie-teller from some negative outcome or for 
personal gain (Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002). 
These types of lies have been examined among children in a multitude of contexts, with a 
primary focus on their understanding of lie-telling, development of the ability to lie, the 
influence of social conventions on lying, and lying in forensic situations (e.g., as an eyewitness 
to a crime) (Bussey, 1992; DePaulo et al., 1996; Talwar & Lee, 2002). 
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Although the majority of the research on lie-telling in these various contexts has occurred 
in the past two decades, Darwin published the first article on lying in 1877. Interest in the topic 
then became dormant until Piaget’s seminal work on children’s moral understanding of lying in 
1932. Around the same time, Hartshorne and May (1928) published a study on dishonest 
behavior in children. It then took over 50 years for their work to be continued by Lewis, Stanger, 
and Sullivan in 1989, through a study examining deception in three-year-old children. Since 
then, interest in children’s lying behavior has remained robust (Lee, 2013; Talwar & Crossman, 
2011).  
The development of moral behavior. While it is theoretically possible to examine lie-
telling without addressing morality more generally, like examining a single pixel in a 
photograph, doing so misses the broader context in which that behavior develops. Thus, 
exploration of moral development provides a more robust understanding of the socialization of 
lie-telling. 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1971), following in the footsteps of Jean Piaget, developed one of 
the first comprehensive theories regarding the development of moral behavior. In its final 
iteration, Kohlberg’s theory consisted of six developmental stages which spanned an individual’s 
lifetime. The six stages were grouped into three levels of two stages each: pre-conventional 
morality, conventional morality, post-conventional morality (Kohlberg, 1971).  
Kohlberg (1971) considered the pre-conventional level of morality to be primarily 
characterized by the tendency to determine the morality of an action by examining its direct 
consequence. While this level of morality is most commonly seen in children, adults can also 
remain indefinitely at this level (Kohlberg, 1971). In stage one, an individual is focused on the 
direct consequences of their actions on themselves in determining the morality of their behavior 
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(i.e. the more severe the punishment, the more evil the action) (Kohlberg, 1971). In stage two, an 
individual develops self-interest and determines what is “right” by determining what action 
would have the best outcome for themselves (Kohlberg, 1971). 
The conventional level of morality is characterized by the tendency to judge the morality 
of an action by evaluating it against societal mores, values, and expectations (Kohlberg, 1971). 
Generally, adolescents and adults achieve this level of moral reasoning. In stage three, an 
individual strives to conform to society’s rules in order to gain approval from others (Kohlberg, 
1971). In stage four, an individual moves from conforming to society’s expectations in order to 
gain approval to understanding the importance of obeying laws and social conventions in 
maintaining a functioning society (Kohlberg, 1971). 
The final, post-conventional, level is characterized by an individual’s realization they are 
an entity separate from society and have the ability to disobey societal rules that are at odds with 
their own principles (Kohlberg, 1971). It is considered fairly rare for someone to achieve this 
level of moral development. In stage five, an individual perceives laws as social contracts that 
should be altered when it would benefit the majority of the population (Kohlberg, 1971). In stage 
six, laws are evaluated in regards to their contribution to justice, and an individual is obligated to 
disobey unjust laws (Kohlberg, 1971). Kohlberg also hypothesized about a stage seven, in which 
an individual combines religion with moral reasoning, and transitional stages, in which an 
individual fluctuates between two stages of moral reasoning while in the process of transitioning 
from one stage to another, but these were not officially added to the theory (Kohlberg & 
Ryncarz, 1990). 
One controversial aspect of Kohlberg’s theory was his assertion that men were more 
likely to achieve the highest stage of moral reasoning than women (Kohlberg, 1971). While 
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Kohlberg’s research did support this statement, it raised questions of whether Kohlberg’s theory 
was inherently biased towards men (Gilligan, 1982). According to Carol Gilligan (1982), men 
tend to emphasize the role of justice in moral reasoning, whereas women tend to emphasize the 
role of caring. Since Kohlberg’s theory emphasized the role of justice in determining the 
attainment of stages, Gilligan (1982) argued women were excluded from higher levels of moral 
reasoning in Kohlberg’s theory by default. 
To address this issue, Gilligan (1982) adapted Kohlberg’s stages to create a women-
specific model of moral development called the “Stages of the Ethics of Care.” Gilligan retained 
Kohlberg’s original three levels, pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional, but 
altered their definitions based on her research on women’s development of moral behavior. Like 
Kohlberg, Gilligan (1982) considered the pre-conventional level to be characterized by a focus 
on survival and self-interest. However, Gilligan (1982) described the conventional level as being 
characterized by a tendency to prioritize selflessness and caring about others, and the post-
conventional level to be characterized by acceptance of responsibility for one’s actions and 
asserting control over one’s life. 
Urie Bronfenbrenner also developed a theory surrounding the development of moral 
behavior. However, unlike Kohlberg and Gilligan, Bronfenbrenner considered the influence of 
culture and a person’s environment on their moral development (Garbarino & Bronfenbrenner, 
1976). His theory consisted of five moral orientations, which are somewhat analogous to 
Kohlberg’s stages. The first orientation, self-oriented morality, is similar to Kohlberg’s pre-
conventional morality, with the individual’s focus primarily on self-gratification (Garbarino & 
Bronfenbrenner, 1976).  
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The next three orientations, authority-oriented morality, peer-oriented morality, and 
collective-oriented morality, are closely related to Kohlberg’s conventional morality. In 
authority-oriented morality, the individual considers authority figures to have the final word on 
issues of morality, whereas in peer-oriented morality, the individual’s morality is determined by 
their peers (Garbarino & Bronfenbrenner, 1976). In collective-oriented morality, individual 
interests are superseded by the goals of an individual’s group. Bronfenbrenner’s final orientation, 
objectively oriented morality, is considered analogous to Kohlberg’s post-conventional morality. 
Within this orientation, the individual has identified universal principles regarding morality that 
are independent from individual or group interests (Garbarino & Bronfenbrenner, 1976). 
In sum, across all three theories there is a consensus that the development of moral 
behavior can be separated into distinct stages that are attained at an individual’s unique pace (and 
sometimes not at all). There also appears to be a consistent connection between an individual’s 
primary focus shifting from the self to others and their understanding of higher levels of moral 
reasoning that are more abstract and less rigid. As discussed below, this suggests the 
development of moral reasoning occurs many years after the development of lying.  
The development of lie-telling. The results of studies that investigated the development 
of lying behaviors in children suggest children tell their first lies in the preschool years (Newton, 
Reddy, & Bull, 2000; Wilson, Smith, & Ross, 2003). These lies tend to be unsophisticated and 
motivated by a desire to avoid punishment or to receive a reward (Newton et al., 2000; 
Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Wilson et al., 2003). Prosocial lies, on the other hand, tend to appear 
later on (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Talwar & Lee, 2002). The later onset of prosocial lie telling 
is thought to be due to children’s inability to understand the purpose of prosocial lies (i.e., to 
protect another) or the complex social rules regarding their appropriate use (Talwar & Crossman, 
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2011). In addition, prosocial lies might cause greater cognitive and emotional strain by requiring 
the child to inhibit their own goals and motivations in order to meet another person’s, potentially 
competing, goals (Talwar & Lee, 2008). However, it has also been suggested children are 
capable of telling what appear to be prosocial lies at an early age, but the motivation behind the 
lie may be self-oriented (i.e., to avoid negative consequences; Popliger et al., 2011; Talwar, 
Murphy, & Lee, 2007; Xu et al., 2010). As the child matures, the motivation behind prosocial 
lies likely shifts from self-oriented to other-oriented goals (i.e., to prevent hurt feelings; Popliger 
et al., 2011).  
To better understand the foundation for the development of children’s lie-telling ability, 
researchers have examined the relationship between children’s theory of mind development and 
lying. Lying essentially requires the child to understand the difference between what they know 
and what others know, and that others’ knowledge can be manipulated through deception 
(Talwar & Crossman, 2011). However, the extent of the understanding needed to tell or 
recognize a lie is still unclear, as is whether the type of lie being examined (i.e., prosocial v. 
antisocial) impacts that answer (Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Talwar & Lee, 2008). In general, 
researchers have attempted to answer these questions by examining whether a child’s lie-telling 
abilities are correlated with a theory of mind developmental stage. Specifically, researchers have 
concentrated on the differences in lie-telling abilities between children who are able to predict 
the causal impact of creating a false belief in another person (i.e., “If I said I did not look at the 
toy, then I must not know what the toy is.”; second-order theory of mind understanding), 
children who are limited to merely representing a belief that is at odds with reality (i.e., “I didn’t 
look at the toy.”; first-order theory of mind understanding), and children who have not yet 
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realized the separation between their spoken words and their thoughts (Talwar & Crossman, 
2011). 
Since children who have not yet attained second-order theory of mind understanding 
struggle to maintain a lie when asked follow-up questions, it is thought the ability to deceive will 
progressively improve as a child achieves each theory of mind stage and increases their overall 
cognitive abilities (Frye & Moore, 1991; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007). Talwar, Gordon, and 
Lee (2007) were able to directly test this hypothesis through an experiment which examined age 
differences in self-serving lies in children aged 6 to 11 years old. Their results found a positive 
correlation between children’s attainment of second-order belief understanding and their ability 
to successfully maintain a lie while being questioned. Children who had not attained second-
order belief understanding still provided an initial lie, but were unable to remain consistent in 
their denial (Talwar et al., 2007).  
Additional support for this hypothesis was provided through a recent study demonstrating 
the emergence of lying behavior in children after they were provided with theory of mind 
training (Ding et al., 2015). Initially, the 3-year-old children were unable to lie; after one month 
of theory of mind training, they were consistently capable of lying. In contrast, the control group, 
which received training on physical concepts, was significantly less likely to lie than the theory 
of mind trained group (Ding et al., 2015). Finally, the connection between theory of mind 
understanding and lying behavior is also supported by studies demonstrating poor lying abilities 
in children with autism - a disorder frequently associated with deficient theory of mind 
development (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Sodian & Frith, 1992; Talwar et al., 2012). 
 In regards to cognitive abilities, there has been some indication that deficits in executive 
functioning skills (i.e., self-regulation, inhibition, planning) may be linked to difficulties in lying. 
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Of the few studies to investigate this hypothesis, one found a significant positive relationship 
between executive functioning skills and success in physical acts of deception (Carlson et al., 
1998). While this study did not directly examine lie-telling behavior, it does suggest that deficits 
in cognitive abilities, particularly executive functioning skills, may be related to difficulties in 
deception (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998). Another study found a significant positive relationship 
between a child’s executive functioning skills and their likelihood of lying (Talwar & Lee, 
2008). Specifically, the study found that a child’s ability to inhibit the impulse to report a 
transgression when questioned was positively related to their performance on a Stroop task 
(Talwar & Lee, 2008). 
Socialization of lie-telling. In addition to developing a theory of mind, children must 
also develop an understanding of the social norms involved in lie-telling. While, in general, 
society tends to consider lying “bad” or “undesirable,” there are many situations in which society 
encourages lie-telling (Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983; Talwar & Crossman, 2011). In 
particular, children learn from an early age to tell prosocial lies in order to avoid hurting 
another’s feelings or to protect another from some form of harm (Talwar et al., 2007). It is 
important to note that, while all cultures practice deception in one form or another, the social 
norms surrounding lying can differ significantly (Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman & Lee, 2007; Lee et 
al., 1997). Those children who fail to develop an understanding of socially acceptable lying will 
likely have difficulty navigating social situations, such as school and work, which tend to require 
a number of “white” or “polite” lies in order to achieve success. 
As can be inferred from society’s tendency to distinguish between prosocial and 
antisocial lies, individuals can have very different reactions to another’s lie depending on the 
perceived motivation behind it. In general, prosocial lies tend to evoke positive reactions – or at 
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least less negative reactions, than telling the blunt truth - whereas antisocial lies tend to evoke 
negative reactions (Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Talwar et al., 2007). It is through this feedback 
that children likely learn when and how to deliver various types of lies (Popliger et al., 2011). 
This feedback could be received from anyone the child is exposed to, though parents, teachers, 
and peers are likely to exhibit a greater influence on the child’s behavior due to their consistent 
presence (Cole & Mitchell, 1998; Talwar & Lee, 2002). To date, however, little research has 
been conducted on the socialization of children’s lie-telling, despite its likely importance in 
shaping lie-telling behavior. 
The one study that has examined the socialization of lie-telling behavior surveyed 146 
parents about their beliefs regarding lie-telling, how they socialized their children about lie-
telling, and whether their children’s actual behavior corresponded with their parents’ attempts at 
socialization (Lavoie, Leduc, Crossman, & Talwar, 2016). The study found a higher frequency of 
self-serving lie-telling among children whose parents conveyed the message that lying was 
sometimes acceptable, compared to children whose parents conveyed it was never acceptable 
(Lavoie et al., 2016). 
Studies that have examined the socialization of prosocial behavior in general have 
consistently found that children exposed to adults modeling prosocial behavior exhibit greater 
prosocial behavior themselves for days or weeks afterwards (Grusec, 1992; McGrath, Wilson, & 
Frassetto, 1995). However, the effects varied with the length of exposure to the prosocial 
stimulus, the degree of familiarity with the model (i.e. stranger v. parent), and individual child 
characteristics (such as age and gender; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Of note, studies showed 
parents and teachers to have a stronger impact on prosocial behavior than siblings and peers, 
though all exhibited some influence (Grusec & Hastings, 2014). 
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Given the propositions that children’s truth- and lie-telling is socialized by those around 
them, and the socialization process is impacted by a child’s individual characteristics, it is likely 
that characteristics that remain stable across a child’s life span (i.e., race, gender, physical 
disabilities, etc.) could significantly affect the feedback they receive in regards to lie-telling. A 
mental health diagnosis, for example, could create situations in which children are not 
appropriately socialized about lying. This could occur because the adult feels uncomfortable 
correcting a child with a mental health diagnosis or attributes the socially unacceptable lie-telling 
behavior to the mental health diagnosis and, as a result, fails to provide appropriate feedback 
because they believe it will have no effect. In addition, the presence or absence of stereotypes or 
stigma surrounding the mental health diagnosis could significantly impact the content, tone, and 
frequency of the feedback. Although no studies have examined this issue directly, the literature 
on the socialization of stigma, and mental health stigma in general, provides insight to the 
potential processes at work. 
A note on truth-telling. In comparison to lie-telling, little attention has been paid to how 
truth-tellers are perceived. While this is understandable, considering the societal expectation of 
“truth” being the default form of communication (Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011), 
there are instances in which truth-tellers provoke a negative reaction in listeners. In particular, 
statements that could be categorized as “blunt” truths can provoke negative reactions (Brimbal & 
Crossman, 2016; Brimbal, Zottoli, & Crossman, 2016). Blunt truths are statements that, while 
true, are likely to hurt the feelings of the intended recipient or group and might generally be 
replaced by “polite” or “white” lies. For example, a child who states, “This is the worst food 
ever!” when asked about his grandmother’s cooking might be reprimanded for his honesty and 
instructed (either directly or indirectly) to state a polite lie (i.e. “The food is great, Grandma!”) if 
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presented with the question again. In these situations, society has deemed polite lies to be more 
socially acceptable than blunt truths, despite society’s stated preference for the truth in all other 
matters (with the caveat that cultural norms surrounding blunt truths differ across different 
societies and cultures – Fu et al., 2007).    
Another interesting aspect of truth-telling that has received little attention by researchers 
is the phenomenon of telling the truth and then being accused of lying. For example, many 
women who are sexually assaulted do not report the crime to the police due to fear that they will 
not be believed (Edwards et al., 2011). Relatedly, there have also been recent reports of African 
American female doctors being accused of lying about their level of education by individuals 
who could not believe an African American woman was capable of becoming a doctor (Wible, 
2016). Although not the focus of the current investigation, these types of events demonstrate the 
importance of considering the actual and perceived truth of a matter separately in evaluating 
individuals’ truths and lies, as well as additional ways in which characteristics of a truth- or lie-
teller might impact perceptions of their truths and lies, through the process of stigmatization, as 
explored below.  
Socialization of Stigma 
The concept of stigma originates with the Greeks, who cut or burned marks onto the 
bodies of criminals, slaves, and traitors in order to brand them as “tainted” or “immoral” 
individuals who should be avoided by society (Goffman, 1963). Since then, stigma has evolved 
beyond a physical mark and now applies to any characteristic, visible or not, that incites social 
censure (Bos, Pryor, Reeder, & Stutterheim, 2013). In 1963, Goffman provided what is now 
considered to be the standard definition of stigma. He stated stigma was a “‘mark’ that signals to 
others that an individual possesses an attribute reducing him or her from ‘whole and usual’ to 
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‘tainted and discounted’” (as cited by Pescosolido, 2013, p. 4). This “mark” could be a physical 
deformity, mental illness, race, gender, or religion, among other characteristics. Significantly, 
stigma could only be enacted in a social environment and was characterized by exclusion from 
full participation in society (Pescosolido, 2013). Since stigma is not considered to reside within 
the person being stigmatized, but rather within the social context that it occurs, what is 
considered stigmatizing can change from one social context to another (Crocker, Major, & 
Steele, 1998).  
Because stigmatizing attitudes vary as a function of social context, individuals in a social 
group likely undergo a process of socialization through which they learn what characteristics are 
stigmatized in their social context. Indeed, it is likely that this socialization occurs early in 
development. Corrigan (2004) proposed a four-component model to explain the social-cognitive 
processes that might lead to the stigmatization of a “marked” person in a social group: cues 
(labels, symptoms, social skills deficits, and physical appearance), stereotypes (knowledge 
structures concerning a marked social group), prejudiced attitudes (evaluative cognitive and 
affective responses), and discriminatory behaviors (negative actions) (see also Link’s modified 
labeling theory; Link et al., 1989). This model has been successfully applied in examining stigma 
towards mental health treatment (Luoma et al., 2007; Pederson & Vogel, 2007; Vogel, Wade, & 
Haake, 2006), stigma towards mental disorders across cultures (Griffiths et al., 2006), and the 
impact of programs challenging mental illness stigma (Corrigan & Shapiro, 2010), among others.  
It is through prejudiced attitudes and, more often, discriminatory behaviors that “marked” 
persons are made aware of the existence of stigma and experience its harmful effects (i.e. loss of 
employment opportunities, ostracization, etc.) (Corrigan, 2004). Some theorists have argued that 
the increased awareness of mental illness stigma has decreased discriminatory behaviors and 
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lessened the harmful effects of stigma (Link et al., 1989), nevertheless, research has consistently 
linked mental illness stigma to discriminatory behaviors and harmful effects. Moreover, while 
only the concept of public stigma will be addressed here, it is important to note that stigma can 
also occur in the forms of self-stigma (the internalization of negative beliefs about a stigmatized 
condition one possesses), stigma by association (negative reactions to individuals associated with 
a stigmatized person), and structural stigma (legitimization of stigma by cultural institutions) 
(Pryor & Reeder, 2011; Yanos, Roe, Markus, & Lysaker, 2008).  
While the terms are often used interchangeably, it is also important to consider whether 
there is a discernable difference between stigma and prejudice. In defining prejudice, most 
contemporary researchers still refer to Allport’s (1954) description of prejudice as “antipathy 
based on a faulty or inflexible generalization” (p. 300; Dixon, Durrheim, Kerr, & Thomae, 
2013). Historically, the term prejudice has been used within areas of research that focus on 
intergroup domination and exploitation (i.e., ethnicity, gender), whereas stigma has been more 
frequently used in research on norm enforcement and disease avoidance (i.e., disabilities, mental 
illness) (Phelan, Link, & Dovidio, 2008). However, some researchers have argued that stigma is 
merely a form of prejudice (Corrigan, 2004). Others have suggested that the key difference 
between the two terms is stigma’s condition of a perceived “negative deviance,” whereas 
prejudice can occur in the absence of a perceived deviance (Bos et al., 2013). For the purposes of 
this paper, the terms stigma and prejudice will be used interchangeably, as both bodies of 
literature inform understanding of the developmental origins of stigmatization and how some 
individuals come to be treated as “tainted and discounted” in different social contexts. 
Development of stigma and prejudice. The origins of stigma are a source of 
considerable academic debate from which a number of theories have emerged to explain how 
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prejudicial beliefs are passed from one generation to another. Early research on the topic focused 
primarily on identifying the developmental stage at which prejudicial beliefs are first seen. One 
possibility is that they emerge from early in-group preferences.  For instance, research has 
demonstrated an own-race preference for novel faces in children as young as 3 months old (Bar-
Haim, Ziv, Lamy, & Hodes, 2006; Kelly et al., 2005). This in-group preference does not appear 
to be driven by an inherent bias favoring the in-group, as infants did not demonstrate a similar 
preference in social interactions with peers (Kinzler & Spelke, 2011). However, by 5 years of 
age, an in-group bias appears to develop, with children expressing preference for own-race 
friends and toys used by own-race children (Kinzler & Spelke, 2011). Thus, it is important to 
note that while in-group preferences can appear early, they are not fixed and are not necessarily 
indicative of prejudicial bias (i.e., negative attitudes or beliefs regarding an out-group) (Killen, 
Hitti, & Mulvey, 2015). 
Interestingly, studies have found an increase in prejudicial expression (i.e., the adoption 
and communication of negative beliefs about a group) between the ages of 3 and 7, followed by a 
decrease until age 12 (Aboud, 1988). It is hypothesized this decrease in prejudicial expression at 
7 years old is due to increased awareness of individuals’ various characteristics - which reduces 
the tendency to define an individual by a single, potentially unfavorable, characteristic (Killen, 
Hitti, & Mulvey, 2015). For example, a 5-year-old might consider his classmate’s skin color to 
be their only identifying characteristic, whereas an 8-year-old is capable of understanding that 
skin color is just one of many characteristics that could be used to describe another person.  
Unfortunately, a decrease in prejudicial expression does not necessarily indicate a 
decrease in prejudicial stereotypes or beliefs. Prejudice can exist at a conscious level (explicit 
bias) and an unconscious level (implicit bias) (Killen, Hitti, & Mulvey, 2015). Thus, a decrease 
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in prejudicial expression, a form of explicit bias, does not necessarily indicate a corresponding 
decrease in implicit bias. In fact, a study of 11- to 14-year-olds found greater implicit prejudicial 
evaluations among older participants than younger participants (Degner & Wentura, 2010). This 
suggests a potentially inverse relationship between explicit and implicit bias in children, with 
implicit bias increasing as explicit bias decreases.  
However, the acquisition of biases can vary depending on a participant’s group 
membership. As in-group biases tend to form primarily within high status groups, members of 
“low” status groups tend to exhibit non-biased or out-group biased attitudes (Bigler, Brown, & 
Markell, 2001). For example, boys (a “high” status group) tend to develop biases favoring the 
male gender, whereas girls (a “low” status group) tend to develop non-biased gender attitudes 
(Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993). Similarly, white children tend to develop biases favoring 
their own race, whereas African American children tend to develop non-biased or out-group 
biased (i.e., favoring the white race) attitudes (Newheiser & Olson, 2011; Spencer & Markstrom-
Adams, 1990). 
When group memberships intersect (i.e., identifying as “black” and “male”), it can lead 
to conflicting or exacerbated in-group preferences and out-group biases (Cole, 2009; Simien, 
2007). To date, there has been little research conducted on the impact of intersecting group 
memberships on the development of biases or stigma. However, it is likely that the salience of a 
particular group membership to a given situation will have an impact on an individual’s biases. 
In addition, if an individual considers himself a member of two in-groups that share a bias, that 
bias is more likely to become integrated into the individual’s identity than a bias that is not 
shared, or even contradicted, by his in-groups.   
30 
 
Researchers also investigated how group preferences or biases are transmitted from 
generation to generation. A popular view, expressed by Gordon Allport in The Nature of 
Prejudice, theorized that “up to puberty, children’s prejudices are mostly secondhand” and 
“parroted views of the parents” (1954, pp. 297). Drawing on Piaget’s (1952) theory of the 
acquisition of cognitive concepts, Allport (1954) proposed children formed prejudicial beliefs 
through two socialization processes: adopting parental prejudice through the direct transfer of 
words or gestures and developing prejudice through immersion in a home environment which 
allows prejudice to form. In the 1980’s, Frances Aboud (1988) directly tested this theory through 
a meta-analysis of all empirical studies examining the relationship between a parent and child’s 
prejudicial beliefs. The results were completely at odds with the prevailing consensus at the time 
– no reliable correlation was found between parent and child prejudice.  
Developmental theories of the socialization of stigma and prejudice. Following 
Aboud’s surprising results, several comprehensive theories were developed to address the 
apparent disconnect between parents’ and children’s prejudice. The first, Social-Cognitive 
Developmental Theory (SCDT), was developed by Aboud in an attempt to explain his findings 
(1988, 2008). It drew on Piagetian theory and hypothesized that prejudice develops parallel to 
changes in a child’s dominant mode of information processing (i.e., affective, perceptual, 
cognitive) and dominant focus of attention (i.e., self, groups, individuals). As such, Aboud 
(1988, 2008) proposed that children are unavoidably prejudiced until age 7 because of the 
limitations of their cognitive abilities and focus of attention.  
Under the age of 7, a child’s primary focus is egocentric, categorical, and heavily 
influenced by their in-group membership (Aboud, 1988; Aboud, 2008). Thus, all evaluations of 
others tend towards extremes (i.e., good or bad, us or them), with the child’s in-groups 
31 
 
automatically occupying the ‘good’ spots. After age 7, children develop the ability to recognize 
multiple, and at times conflicting, group identifications within a single person (Aboud, 1988; 
Aboud, 2008). Thus, the range of potential evaluations increase (for example) from ‘good’ or 
‘bad,’ to ‘good,’ ‘mostly good,’ ‘somewhat good,’ ‘neutral,’ ‘slightly bad,’ ‘mostly bad,’ or 
‘bad.’  
In addition, based on his findings of a lack of correlation between parent and child 
prejudices, Aboud (1988) assumed that parent-child socialization was irrelevant to prejudice. 
Other theorists found Aboud’s complete elimination of socialization from the process of 
prejudice formation to be an extreme response to his findings and attempted to craft theories 
which allocated parents at least a minimal role in the process.  
Developed by Drew Nesdale (1999), Social Identity Development Theory (SIDT) drew 
on social identity theory and self-categorization theory to explain children’s prejudice formation. 
It postulated that early in-group preferences were the result of self-categorization and social 
comparison, and socialization had no impact at this stage. Starting at age 7, Nesdale theorized 
that children become capable of adopting prejudicial beliefs held by their present in-group. 
However, they only adopt these prejudices if they decide their identity is consistent with the 
beliefs and attitudes of the in-group. At this point, according to SIDT, parents can have some 
influence on a child’s prejudice formation. Nevertheless, parental influence lessens as the child 
ages and other socialization agents (i.e. peers, media, etc.) compete for the child’s attention and 
become part of the child’s evolving identity.  
In contrast to the previous two theories, which centered around age-related 
developmental changes, Developmental Intergroup Theory (DIT) is based on a variety of factors, 
including social and cognitive processes (Bigler & Liben, 2006). DIT proposes that prejudice 
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develops from the social meaning children assign to various salient categories based on 
perceptual distinctiveness (i.e., visible differences), proportional size (i.e., majority v. minority 
status), and their perception of adults’ explicit labeling and functional use of social categories 
(Bigler & Liben, 2006). Parents can increase the likelihood a specific social category will 
become salient through explicit labeling or functional use, but no more so than any other social 
agent. Once these categories are constructed, children give them meaning by attributing beliefs 
and judgments to the categories. As children are motivated to see their own group as positive, 
negative qualities are more likely to be assigned to out-groups (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Degner & 
Dalege, 2013). Children also integrate environmental information derived through observation 
and explicit messages in assigning meaning to social categories. Through this combination of 
internal and external sources of information, children learn to associate certain attributes (i.e., 
traits, behaviors, roles) and affect (i.e., liking) with various social categories – thus forming 
stereotypes and prejudice (Bigler & Liben, 2006).  
Societal-Social-Cognitive-Motivation Theory (SSCMT) is very similar to DIT, but places 
more emphasis on the various environmental sources from which children can acquire 
information (Barrett, 2007). It identifies parents, teachers, peers, the media, school textbooks, the 
internet, and more as potential sources of information. Most importantly, and its primary 
divergence from DIT, SSCMT considers parents to play a particularly influential role in this 
process. According to SSCMT, parents influence their children directly and indirectly – through 
their verbal statements and practices, and through their choices regarding the child’s 
environment (i.e., neighborhood, school, media) (Barret, 2007; Degner & Dalege, 2013; Katz, 
2003). These choices allow parents to limit the influences their child is exposed to and, 
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consequently, help shape their children’s understanding of social categories and related attitudes 
(Barret, 2007).  
In sum, the field has made almost a full circle in its quest to understand prejudice 
formation. Initially, parents were thought to be the only, or at least primary, source of a child’s 
prejudice (Allport, 1954). Following Aboud’s (1988) findings of no reliable correlation between 
parent and child prejudices, the field swung 180 degrees in the other direction and considered 
parents to have little to no influence on their child’s prejudice formation. Now, with SSCMT, the 
field has come to recognize the importance of parental influence, both direct and indirect, as well 
as the impact of other cognitive, social, and environmental influences (Barret, 2007).   
Attribution Theory 
Although the various theories on the socialization of stigma discussed above provide a 
framework for understanding the transmission of stigma from one generation to the next, they do 
not explain the initial origin of stigma. Why are some personal characteristics, including 
superficial characteristics, viewed more negatively or positively than others? Why do situational 
and interpersonal factors sometimes impact the valence of a person’s assessment of others? 
Attribution theory attempts to answer these questions by examining the process through which 
individuals attempt to explain the causes of behaviors and events (Heider, 1958).  
Although attribution theory does not directly address early childhood categorization (i.e. 
before the development/understanding of stereotypes/prejudicial bias), research conducted on in-
groups and out-groups provides the likely explanation. As was discussed in more detail above, 
individuals inherently view groups they are members of (i.e., in-groups) more positively than 
those they are not members of (i.e., out-groups). Thus, the valence of early attributions can be 
linked to the individual’s membership in the group at question (i.e., mental illness, race, gender, 
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etc.). As such, the earliest determination of whether one’s personal characteristics are viewed as 
negative or positive by another is whether that person also considers themselves to have that 
characteristic. 
One of the foundational concepts of attribution theory is the idea of external and internal 
causal attributions. Franz Heider (1958) proposed that individuals attribute behavior to either 
internal characteristics, such as personality traits, or to situations or events outside of an 
individual’s control. There has been some suggestion that internal attributions are particularly 
likely to be made when an individual’s behavior is seen as intentional, as opposed to accidental 
or impulsive (Jones & Davis, 1965). Since intentional behavior suggests a conscious link 
between a motive and the subsequent behavior, internal attributions allow for predictions of 
future behavior (Jones & Davis, 1965). In addition to intent, behaviors seen as freely chosen, low 
in social desirability, directly beneficial or harmful to the observer, or directed at the observer are 
also likely to be attributed to internal factors (Jones & Davis, 1965). In contrast, external 
attributions are more likely to be made when a person is perceived to be of low status (in regards 
to ‘good’ behaviors only), impulsive, or coerced (Jones & Davis, 1965).  
Attributional tendencies have also been found to be impacted by a person’s general world 
view. When a person has an overall optimistic attributional style, they tend to explain negative 
events in terms of external causes and positive events in terms of internal causes. On the other 
hand, when a person has an overall pessimistic attributional style, they explain negative events in 
terms of internal causes and positive events in terms of external causes.  
Researchers also considered the possibility of error in individuals’ attributional process. 
In 1977, Lee Ross coined the term “fundamental attribution error” to describe the tendency of 
individuals to overemphasize internal attributions and underemphasize external attributions, 
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particularly when explaining the behavior of others. For example, when person A cuts in front of 
person B in rush hour traffic, person A will likely attribute their own actions to external 
attributions (i.e. running late, emergency, etc.) whereas person B will attribute person A’s actions 
to internal attributions (i.e. rude, selfish, etc.). Research has suggested that the presence of this 
bias may be linked to cultural norms, with individualistic cultures more likely to make internal 
attributions and collectivistic cultures more likely to make external attributions (Krull et al., 
1999).  
When applied to the concepts of stigma and stereotypes, attribution theory suggests that, 
as members of society mature, they create “knowledge structures” which contain information 
about various social groups (Corrigan, 2000; Judd & Park, 1993; Krueger, 1996). When an 
individual meets a new person who belongs to one of these pre-existing knowledge structures, 
they are able to quickly categorize the person and draw upon an established set of expectations 
and impressions (Corrigan, 2000). These “knowledge structures” could also be termed 
“stereotypes.” 
Studies have demonstrated that the valence of the knowledge structure’s content is based 
on beliefs (or attributions) surrounding the cause of a person’s membership in a social group 
(Weiner, 1993; Weiner, 1995). Specifically, attributions surrounding the stability and 
controllability of the cause of a person’s group membership have been found to be particularly 
important (Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 1995). Attributions regarding the stability of the cause appear 
to have a greater impact on the magnitude of an individual’s response (Weiner, 1995; Weiner, 
Graham, & Chandler, 1982), whereas attributions regarding the controllability of the cause have 
a greater impact on the emotional valence of the response (Corrigan, 2000; Graham, Weiner, & 
Zucker, 1997; Rush, 1998; Weiner et al., 1982; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).  
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In regards to mental illness, perceptions of stability are inversely linked to perceptions of 
treatability and vary depending on the type of mental illness (Corrigan, 2000). Researchers have 
shown that perceptions of instability are linked to increased helping behaviors and pity 
(Corrigan, 2000; Lin, 1993; Menec & Perry, 1998; Weiner et al., 1988). Controllability, on the 
other hand, is based on beliefs regarding the ability of a mentally ill person to control an event 
(i.e. behavior, symptom). When an individual is believed to be in control of a negative event, 
others are more likely to assign responsibility, express anger, and respond with punitive (i.e. 
discriminatory) behaviors (Corrigan, 2000; Graham, Hudley, & Williams, 1992; Graham et al., 
1997). When an individual is not believed to be in control of an event, others are more likely to 
express pity and respond with helping behaviors (Corrigan, 2000; Dooley, 1995; Menec & Perry, 
1998; Zucker & Weiner, 1993). 
More recently, Corrigan (2000) proposed adding perceptions of dangerousness as a third 
factor in determining the valence of an individual’s attribution after noticing its prevalence in 
analyses of public perceptions of mental illness. In a subsequent study testing the model, 
Corrigan et al. (2003) found that perceptions of dangerousness, while related to perceptions of 
controllability, were independent predictors of fear and punitive responses to mentally ill 
individuals. Thus, the research suggests that whether there will be a positive (helping behavior) 
or negative (punitive behavior) response to an individual identified as belonging to an 
established knowledge structure (stereotype) will depend on perceptions of causality and 
dangerousness. 
Mental Illness Stigma 
In the 1970’s and 80’s, it was commonly argued that stigma towards individuals with 
mental illness did not exist. This conclusion was based on several studies that demonstrated little 
37 
 
impact of mental illness labels on individuals’ evaluation of diagnosed people (for a review, see 
Link et al., 1999). In addition, the 1996 General Social Survey found that despite an overall 
negative view towards mental illness, respondents endorsed the belief that individuals with major 
depression were capable of making their own decisions regarding treatment (Pescosolido, 
Monahan, Link, Stueve, & Kikuzawa, 1999). This was also a period of substantial success for 
mental health advocacy groups and culminated in the first White House conference on mental 
health in 1999 (Corrigan & Penn, 1999).   
However, despite these positive indicators, individuals with mental illness were still 
reporting high levels of stigma. One survey of mental health consumers found 78 percent had 
overheard hurtful or offensive comments about mental illness (Wahl, 1999). Another study found 
the label “mentally ill” impaired individuals’ ability to obtain work, housing, and acceptance 
from their peers (Farina, 1998). It has been suggested the reason for these disparate findings lies 
in the difference between implicit and explicit biases (Teachman, Wilson, & Komarovskaya, 
2006). Due to the work of mental health advocacy groups, individuals have an increased 
awareness of mental illness and the social pressure to appear unbiased towards individuals with 
mental illnesses. As such, on measures of explicit bias, participants respond according to the 
dictates of societal expectations. However, measures of implicit bias reflect attitudes and beliefs 
below the level of conscious control and thus prevent individuals from responding according to 
societal expectations instead of their actual inclinations (Teachman et al., 2006).  
This explanation is supported by a recent comparison of responses to the 1950 and 1996 
General Social Survey (Pescosolido, 2013). The results indicated the general public has become 
more knowledgeable about mental illness and more open to disclosure, recognition, and 
treatment of mental illnesses. However, the results also demonstrated little change in individuals’ 
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social acceptance of persons with mental illness. In 1996, nearly half of the respondents reported 
they would be unwilling to “work closely on the job with” a person diagnosed with depression or 
“spend the evening socializing with” a person diagnosed with schizophrenia (Pescosolido, 2013). 
Three-fourths of respondents reported they would be unwilling to “move next door” to a person 
who had a drug dependence (Pescosolido, 2013). In general, the more “intimate” the setting, the 
more likely it was the respondent would report rejection (Pescosolido, 2013). 
The study also looked at the public’s perception of mental illness in children. While not 
as pronounced as the results for adults, children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) or depression were still socially rejected at greater rates than children with asthma or 
“daily troubles” (Pescosolido, 2013). For example, 29 percent of respondents stated they would 
be unwilling to “make friends with” a child with depression and 22 percent would be unwilling 
to “move next door” to a child with ADHD (Pescosolido, 2013). Surprisingly, while the public 
generally appeared more tolerant towards children with mental health problems than adults with 
mental health problems, this did not hold true for depression. In comparison to adult depression, 
respondents saw childhood depression as more severe, unlikely to improve without treatment, 
and an indicator of potential violence (Pescosolido, 2013). 
In addition, there has been an increase in the perception that individuals with mental 
illness are dangerous to themselves and others (Martin et al., 2000; Perry et al., 2007; Walker et 
al., 2008). Compared to 1950, the odds of a person with mental illness being described as 
“violent” were 2.3 times greater in 1996 (Phelan et al., 2000). Adults with drug dependence 
disorders were consistently viewed as the most dangerous to themselves and others (Corrigan et 
al, 2009; Link et al., 1999; Martin et al., 2000). In regards to depression, children were seen as 
more likely to be violent towards others than adults, girls were seen as less dangerous to self or 
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others than boys, and older children less dangerous to others than younger children (14 years old 
compared to 8 years old) (Perry et al., 2007; Pescosolido et al., 2007). In recent years, 
perceptions of dangerousness appear to have stabilized (Pescosolido et al., 2010).  
Studies have also explored the public’s beliefs concerning shame, blame, and punishment 
of individuals with mental illness. Children reported the belief that having a mental illness was 
more shameful than having asthma, with depression considered more shameful than ADHD 
(Walker et al., 2008). Children were also more likely to blame the parents if a child had a mental 
illness than if a child had asthma (Walker et al, 2008). Compared to individuals with depression, 
adults were less likely to believe that an individual with schizophrenia should be punished or 
blamed for violent behavior (Anglin et al., 2006). Adults who were younger and more 
conservative were also more likely to believe that individuals with mental illness should be 
blamed and punished for violent behavior (Anglin et al., 2006).  
In regards to the competency of individuals with mental illness, children with a mental 
illness are more likely to be viewed as lazy than children with asthma (Walker et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, children with depression are seen as lazier than children with ADHD (Walker et 
al., 2008). Compared to “troubled individuals,” adults with mental illness are viewed as less 
competent to make treatment related and financial decisions (Pescosolido et al., 1999). Within 
diagnoses, adults with schizophrenia and drug abuse disorders are viewed as less competent to 
make treatment and financial decisions than adults with depression (Pescosolido et al., 1999).  
In sum, adults and children report numerous stigmatizing beliefs towards individuals with 
mental illness. Generally, the public views individuals with mental illness as violent and 
incompetent, and has little desire to engage with them socially. The most consistently 
stigmatized groups were children with depression and adults with drug dependence (Parcesepe & 
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Cabassa, 2013). Considering these findings, it is unsurprising individuals with mental illness 
report problems with finding employment, establishing relationships with co-workers and peers, 





Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on the Socialization of Truth- and Lie-Telling  
To date, there has been no research conducted on how stigma towards mental illnesses 
impacts a person’s perception of the mentally ill when truth-telling and minimal research 
conducted on perceptions of the mentally ill when lie-telling. In fact, research concerning 
deception and stigma only intersects in two areas: lie-telling and/or manipulation as one of the 
criteria for a diagnosis (i.e., Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), Borderline Personality 
Disorder, and Conduct Disorder) (see, Hare, Hart, & Harpur, 1991; Gutheil, 1989) and 
malingering. As such, little attention has been given to contextual factors surrounding the lie-
telling behavior or how others react to the lie-telling behavior. There has been no research done 
on lie-telling by individuals with disorders not characterized by manipulation or lie-telling.  
In regards to malingering, the field of Forensic Psychology considers it to be a specific 
type of lie-telling behavior where the individual’s lies are motivated by a desire to obtain some 
kind of reward (Slick et al., 2004). The reward could range from financial gain to a reduced 
prison sentence. Considering the high stakes involved in criminal trials and sentencing, it is 
unsurprising the majority of research on this subject has focused on detecting malingering 
individuals and, to a lesser extent, the motivations behind the decision to malinger (see, 
Mittenberg et al., 2002; Slick et al., 2004).  
 Of note, it is interesting to consider the similarities in tone of the research in the two 
areas. Both appear to adopt a negative view of lie-telling behavior in individuals with mental 
illnesses. However, speech-act theory would suggest that lie-telling serves as a means to 
accomplish specific social objectives (Austin, 1962; Lee, 2013). Rather than dismissing lie-
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telling as merely a “bad” or “pathological” behavior present in the mentally ill, it would be 
interesting to examine other functions of lie-telling behavior in this population. In particular, 
studies examining the usage of prosocial lies or lies motivated by a desire to avoid the negative 
impacts of mental illness stigma by the mentally ill could provide valuable insights as to how lie-
telling behavior impacts a mentally ill individual’s overall functioning and quality of life.  
 As no empirical studies have yet addressed the issue of the impact of mental illness 
stigma on the socialization of truth- and lie-telling, literatures from the topics reviewed above 
have been merged to inform a theoretical model that attempts to outline that process. The 
socialization of truth- and lie-telling portion of the model is based on Grusec’s and Davidov’s 
(2010) theory of socialization and Barrett’s (2007) Societal-Social-Cognitive-Motivation Theory 
(SSCMT) (Figure 2). As can be seen in the figure below, the socialization of truth- and lie-telling 
process begins when an individual tells a truth or lie. From there, the truth or lie is perceived by 
others in a manner (i.e., as a truth or a lie) which leads to an observable reaction to the truth or 
lie. The arrow connecting the second and third steps of the process is red, in order to indicate the 
point at which mental illness stigma can impact the socialization of truth- and lie-telling. 
Once an observable reaction is displayed, the individual telling the truth or lie (i.e., the 
speaker) can perceive the reaction. The speaker then evaluates the observed reaction against their 
desired reaction. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation, the speaker then continues to act 
in the same way or uses the information to alter their future truth- or lie-telling in order to have 
greater success at obtaining their desired reaction. This is the point at which a person’s 
understanding of the social norms, customs, and values regarding truth- and lie-telling is formed, 
shaped, and/or revised.  
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Figure 2. Impact of mental illness stigma on the socialization of truth- and lie-telling. This figure illustrates a proposed model of how 
mental illness stigma can impact the socialization of truth- and lie-telling. 
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As mentioned above, the red arrow in this model refers to the point at which mental 
illness stigma and discriminatory behavior can be activated and impact the socialization of truth- 
and lie-telling. This secondary process, based on concepts from Corrigan’s social-cognitive 
model of stigma (2004) and attributional model of public discrimination (2000), is triggered by 
the categorization of the speaker as a person who has a mental illness by the observer. From 
there, the observer assesses the speaker’s level of control over their behavior and symptoms of 
their mental illness, and their predicted dangerousness (related to their perceived mental illness 
diagnosis). If the observer determines the speaker is not in control of their behavior, they will 
likely react with pity and helping behaviors. If the observer determines the speaker is in control 
of their behavior, they will likely react with anger and punitive or discriminatory behaviors. 
Finally, if the observer determines the speaker is dangerous due to their mental illness, they will 
likely react with fear and punitive or discriminatory behaviors (Farina and Felner, 1973; Farina, 
Felner, & Boudreau, 1973; Farina et al., 1974).  
From there, the socialization of truth- and lie-telling will resume where it left off, with 
the mental illness stigma influencing the observer’s reactions to the speaker. Although no studies 
have examined the exact model described above, there has been some research conducted on 
individuals’ general reactions to different types of lies. Specifically, individuals tend to respond 
more positively to “white” or prosocial lies than to antisocial lies (Bussey, 1999). It is unknown, 
however, how mental illness stigma might influence these reactions.  
Based on research involving behavioral responses to various emotions, it is possible that 
those who feel pity at the end of the secondary process will be less likely to respond negatively 
to the lie than those who feel anger or fear. Individuals who feel pity may also be less likely to 
confront an individual about their truth- or lie-telling than those who feel anger, but may feel 
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inclined to offer corrective feedback in regards to the appropriateness of the truth or lie. In 
contrast, those who feel anger may be more likely to confront an individual’s truth- or lie-telling 
than those who feel pity and/or view it more negatively than those who feel pity or fear. Finally, 
those who feel fear may be more likely to ignore the truth- or lie-telling completely (i.e. not 
offering negative/confrontational feedback, correctional feedback, or positive feedback) than 
those who feel anger or pity. The closeness of the relationship between the speaker and the 
recipient would likely impact the response as well (e.g., parent or teacher versus stranger). 
A potentially significant factor in predicting the emotional response and subsequent 
behavior is whether the truth or lie is perceived as prosocial or antisocial. A lie perceived as 
antisocial may be sufficient to tip someone teetering between pity and anger towards anger, 
whereas a lie perceived as prosocial may tip the response towards pity. Similarly, the way a lie is 
perceived (antisocial v. prosocial) may influence someone’s decision regarding whether to offer 
corrective feedback or not. Since prosocial lies are generally received more positively than 
antisocial lies (Bussey, 1999), it is possible that any situation involving a perceived prosocial lie 
will be more likely to evoke helping behavior than one involving a perceived antisocial lie. 
Although no research has been conducted on prosocial or antisocial truths, it is likely 
individuals’ reactions to antisocial truths will be more negative than their reactions to prosocial 
truths, considering a general societal inclination to reward prosocial behavior and punish 
antisocial behavior.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The following study was the first step in an effort to test the hypothesized theoretical 
model. That is, it has begun the examination of how children’s mental illness labels and 
stigmatization by adults might impact those adults’ perceptions of children’s truth- and lie-
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telling. As such, the focus in this study was on blunt truth-telling versus blunt lie-telling, to 
maximize the differentiation among conditions (as opposed to examining more nuanced, subtle 
forms of truth- and lie-telling). As a single study cannot answer every question, this study 
focused on the following research questions and hypotheses:  
RQ 1: Do mental illness labels impact adults’ perceptions of controllability and 
dangerousness of children who tell lies and truths? 
HY 1: The valence of adults’ overall perceptions of children with mental illness labels 
who tell lies and truths will be inversely correlated to adults’ perceptions of dangerousness. In 
other words, the more dangerous a child is perceived to be, the more negative (less positive) an 
adults’ overall perception of the child will be.  
HY 2: The valence of adults’ overall perceptions of children with mental illness labels 
who tell lies and truths will be inversely correlated to adults’ perceptions of controllability, but to 
a lesser degree than dangerousness. In other words, the more in control of their behavior a child 
is perceived to be, the more negative (less positive) an adults’ overall perception of the child will 
be. 
HY 3: Adults will perceive children with ADHD who tell lies and truths to be less in 
control of their behavior than children with depression who tell lies and truths.  
HY 4: Adults will perceive children with depression who tell lies and truths to be more 
dangerous than children with ADHD who tell lies and truths. 
RQ 2:  Do mental illness labels impact adults’ perceptions of children who tell lies and 
truths? 
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HY 5:  Due to the stigma associated with mental illness labels, adults’ perceptions of 
children who tell lies and truths with mental illness labels will be more negative than their 
perceptions of children who tell lies and truths without mental illness labels.  
HY 6: Based on prior research demonstrating a connection between depression and 
perceptions of dangerousness and controllability, adults’ perceptions of children with depression 
who tell lies and truths will be more negative than their perceptions of children with ADHD who 
tell lies and truths. 
RQ 3: Does the type of truth or lie (antisocial v. prosocial) impact adults’ perceptions of 
and responses to children with mental illness labels? 
HY 7: Adults’ perceptions of children who tell antisocial lies or truths will be more 
negative than their perceptions of children who tell prosocial lies or truths overall, consistent 
with prior research. 
HY 8: Based on prior research demonstrating a connection between depression and 
perceptions of dangerousness and controllability, adults’ perceptions of children with depression 
who tell antisocial lies or truths will be more negative than their perceptions of children with 
ADHD who tell antisocial lies or truths. 
HY 9: Due to perceptions of controllability of a child’s behavior, adults’ perceptions of 
children without mental illness labels who tell antisocial lies or truths will be more negative than 
their perceptions of children with mental illness labels who tell antisocial lies or truths. 
HY 10: Due to perceptions of controllability of a child’s behavior, adults will react more 
punitively towards children without mental illness labels who tell antisocial lies or truths than 
children with mental illness labels who tell antisocial lies or truths. 
 48 
RQ 4:  Do measurements of mental illness stigma predict adults’ reactions to children 
with mental illness labels when they tell truths or lies? 
HY 11:  Adults with high implicit and explicit biases against mental illnesses will have 
more negative perceptions of children with mental illness labels who tell truths and lies, 
compared to adults with low levels of biases. 
HY 12:  Due to less concern about social desirability, adults with high explicit and 
implicit biases against mental illnesses will have more negative perceptions of children with 
mental illness labels who tell truths and lies than adults with high implicit and low explicit biases 






The study was a 4 (child label: control v. ADHD v. depression v. asthma) x 2 (veracity: 
truth v. lie) x 2 (motivation: prosocial v. antisocial) mixed design. Participants were exposed to 4 
conditions – one of each child label, and one of each veracity x motivation combination. The 
child mental illness labels of ADHD and Depression were selected based on their associations 
with two primary dependent variables – dangerousness (Depression) and control (ADHD) – their 
prevalence in childhood, and the potential responsiveness of each mental illness to treatment. 
Participants 
An initial sample (N = 60; 36 females; M = 41 years, SD = 13) was recruited to pilot data 
collection. As a result of the pilot, several questions were edited for clarity purposes and a 
second mention of the mental illness label was inserted in each vignette to increase participant 
awareness of that variable. However, as there were no significant differences in demographics or 
in responses between participants in the pilot sample and the primary sample (N = 372), nor 
meaningful design changes, the samples were combined to provide an overall sample size of 432 
participants. Due to incomplete data and failure to pass manipulation checks, the responses of 28 
participants were removed from the study, resulting in a final sample size of 404 participants. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 73 years, with a mean age of 37 years (SD = 12). 
Approximately 60 percent of the sample was female (N = 242) and 79 percent was white (N = 
320; Black, N = 46; Asian, N = 31; Other, N = 4; note – Hispanic was unintentionally omitted as 
a demographic option, which could mask greater diversity in the sample). Approximately 63 
percent of the sample identified as parents (N = 245). The average level of education attained 
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was a 2-year college degree (less than a high school diploma, N = 4; high school graduate, N = 
37; some college, N = 103; 2-year degree, N = 44; 4-year degree, N = 163; Master’s degree, N = 
42; Doctoral degree, N = 11). 
All participants were recruited through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk service. 
Participants in the pilot study were paid one dollar. Participants in the primary study were paid 
two dollars. All participants were required to be fluent in English and over the age of 18 to be 
eligible to participate in the study. 
Instruments 
Vignettes. Participants read four vignettes – one before each video that they viewed. 
Each vignette described a child with no clinically significant mental or physical illnesses, with 
ADHD, with depression, or with asthma (see Appendix A). Vignettes did not mention the child’s 
age and used gender neutral names to allow for complete randomization of the videos. Order of 
vignettes was randomly assigned. 
Videos. Participants were shown a video following each vignette, consisting of a child 
actor (i.e., the child featured in the prior vignette) making a statement in one of the following 
conditions: antisocial lie, antisocial truth, prosocial lie, or prosocial truth. The child actors 
consisted of 16 children, ages 6-7 years (N = 8; 4 boys; 4 non-white), 10-11 years (N = 4; 2 boys; 
2 non-white), and 14-15 years (N = 4; 2 boys; 2 non-white). All of the child actors recorded 
videos for each of the conditions and the videos were randomly assigned to each vignette, 
providing stimulus variability. However, actors appeared only once for each participant. 
In each video, the child actor sat silently while a voice asked a question (e.g., “Did you 
enjoy your party?”). The ground truth appeared on a black screen (the child did or did not enjoy 
the party) as well as motivational information to manipulate whether the child’s statement was 
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prosocial or antisocial in nature (e.g., statement would make parent happy or step-parent 
unhappy). This was followed by the child’s response. The response was either consistent or 
inconsistent with the ground truth, making the statement either a truth or a lie that, depending on 
the motivation manipulation, was either prosocial or antisocial in nature (see Appendix B). The 
other scenarios involved being asked about a sibling’s whereabouts when the sibling is in 
trouble, being asked if the child likes his/her teacher, and being asked what happened to the 
child’s bike that his/her sibling destroyed. 
Impressions and responses. After each vignette and video pair, participants rated their 
impressions of the child on 7-point scales from 1 (least positive) to 7 (most positive). Ratings 
included two items specifically relevant in theory to perceptions of mental illness (i.e., 
controllability, dangerousness), with lower scores indicating greater perceived uncontrollability 
and dangerousness. They also rated general impression items (i.e., likeability, friendliness, 
trustworthiness, intelligence, behavior, kindness, goodness, reliability, honesty, competence, 
warmth, believability). General impression (GI) items were averaged to represent an overall 
perception of each child, with higher scores indicating more positive impressions. Participants 
also rated their likelihood of rewarding or punishing the child’s behavior and their perceptions of 
the child’s ability to control their lie- or truth-telling. 
Explicit attitudes. Participants’ explicit prejudicial attitudes towards children with 
mental illness were assessed using a version of the Social Distance Scale (SDS) modified by 
Martin, Pescosolido, Olafsdottir, and McLeod (2007). Participants were asked how willing they 
would be to move next door to, spend an evening socializing with the family of, have their child 
make friends with, and have their child in the same classroom of the child in the video they just 
watched. Participants chose one of four answers, ranging from definitely willing to definitely 
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unwilling, in response to each of the four questions on the scale. The reliability for the four-item 
scale is 0.87 (Martin et al., 2007). These questions were presented after each video was shown. 
Implicit attitudes. Participants’ implicit prejudicial attitudes towards children with 
mental illness were assessed using the Brief Implicit Association Task (BIAT) (Sriram & 
Greenwald, 2009). The BIAT is similar to the widely used Implicit Association Test (IAT), 
which measures implicit bias towards one category in relation to an opposing category. In 
contrast, the BIAT assesses bias using two blocks of trials with the same four categories and 
stimulus-response mappings as the IAT, but with only a third of the number of trials (Sriram & 
Greenwald, 2009). Unlike the IAT, the BIAT focuses the participant on only two of each block’s 
four categories. Participants were required to categorize words into corresponding superordinate 
categories by selecting the appropriate key on the keyboard (“E” or “I”). 
In one block, participants were required to select one key when words appeared on the 
screen related to either mental illness OR positively valenced words, and to select a different key 
when words related to either physical illness OR negatively valenced words appeared. In the 
second block, they did the opposite – selecting one key when words related to mental illness OR 
negatively valenced words appeared on the screen, and a different key when words related to 
physical illness OR positively valenced words appeared on the screen. 
Each block consisted of 16 practice trials followed by 40 critical trials. Practice trials had 
a response deadline of 1,000 ms and critical trials had a response deadline of 700 ms. Error 
feedback was provided during the first 100 ms of a 150 ms interstimulus interval, with an “O” or 
an “X” to indicate correct and incorrect responses, respectively. 
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The BIAT, administered last, required participants to access a separate program. Some 
chose not to do so and for others, their responses were invalid (n = 227). Hence, research 
questions involving implicit biases are assessed using a reduced sample, as noted in the results. 
Manipulation check. To ensure that participants were registering the critical information 
presented in the vignettes and videos (the veracity of the statement and the mental illness label), 
participants were presented with a “memory test” following the presentation of each vignette and 
video pair. The “memory test” consisted of several questions about the information contained in 
the vignette and video, including a question asking participants whether the child was lying or 
telling the truth and a question asking participants to select characteristics that describe the child 
in the vignette, with one option being the mental illness label. 
Demographics. Participants completed a basic demographic questionnaire. 
Procedure 
 The study was administered using Qualtrics. Participants were provided with the link to 
the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk interface. Informed consent was obtained. 
Participants were then asked to read the first vignette and watch the first video. Afterwards, 
participants completed a “memory test,” rated their impressions/responses, and answered the 
four Social Distance Scale questions in regards to the first video/vignette. This sequence was 
repeated three more times, until each participant had read four vignettes and watched a video 
from all four truth/lie conditions (one per child label). Participants then completed the 
demographic questionnaire and the BIAT. Following completion of the BIAT, participants were 
debriefed and payment deposited in their Amazon.com account. 
Data Analysis 
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 were examined by conducting Spearman’s bivariate r correlations. 
Cohen’s standard was used to evaluate the correlation coefficient, with 0.10 to 0.29 representing 
a weak association between two variables, 0.30 to 0.49 representing a moderate association, and 
0.50 or larger representing a strong association. Hypotheses 3 through 12 were examined using 
linear mixed effects analyses. For each dependent variable, fixed effects entered into each model 
were: video child diagnostic label, veracity, motivation, age, gender and race, content of video 
scripts, and order of video scripts, and the two-way interactions between diagnostic label and 
veracity, motivation child age, gender and race, as well as between veracity and motivation, 
where appropriate. Intercepts for subjects were entered as random effects. Model reduction was 
accomplished using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), selecting the model that reduced 
the BIC by at least 2 (Seltman, 2009), with diagnostic label retained for conceptual reasons in all 





From 404 participants, a total of 1288 complete observations were obtained (i.e., correct 
truth/lie manipulation check, impression ratings and responses, and explicit attitudes/SDS ratings 
completed), and only 930 complete observations correctly identified the child’s motivation as 
antisocial or prosocial. This formed the sample for most analyses. However, only 205 
participants completed the BIAT in a valid manner (over 70% correct responses). Hence, 
analyses that included IAT data were conducted with this smaller sample size. The means, 
standard deviations and ranges for each of the dependent variables, including the combined GI 
variable and mean SDS scores, can be seen in Table 1. Table 2 shows these values as a function 
of child diagnostic label. The BIAT values represent D scores. 
 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics for Participant Ratings 
  n M SD Minimum Maximum 
Controllability 404 5.89 1.10 1 7 
Dangerousness 404 5.15 1.69 1 7 
General Impression (GI)* 404 4.84 1.15 1 7 
Combined SDS Ratings** 404 3.12 0.75 1 4 
BIAT 205 0.42 0.47 -0.77 1.57 
*Overall rating variable created by averaging all ratings (excluding controllability and 
dangerousness) 
**Overall rating variable created by averaging the four SDS ratings 
 
 
Controllability and Dangerousness 
The first four hypotheses focused on whether mental illness labels impact adults’ 
perceptions of the dangerousness and controllability of children who tell lies and truths. 
Correlations were first computed between raters’ mean GI ratings and their ratings of children’s 
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dangerousness and controllability ratings (see Table 3). Higher GI ratings indicate more positive 
child perceptions, while higher ratings of controllability and dangerousness reflect perceptions 
that the child is more in control and less dangerous. The results indicated that participants tended 
to have more negative general perceptions of children they perceived to be more dangerous (r = 
0.48, p < 0.01). Similarly, participants tended to have more negative perceptions of children they 
perceived to be out of control (r = 0.33, p < 0.01). In other words, the more in control of their 
behavior and less dangerous a child was perceived to be, the more positive the participants’ 
overall perception of the child was. Thus, these findings supported Hypotheses 1, but found the 
inverse of Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 2  
Mean (SD) Participant Ratings as a Function of Child Label 
  n ADHD Depression Asthma Control 
Controllability 404 5.80 (1.15) 5.79 (1.13) 6.01 (1.03) 5.96 (1.09) 
Dangerousness 404 5.16 (1.69) 5.02 (1.70) 5.28 (1.70) 5.17 (1.68) 
General Impression (GI)* 404 4.85 (1.15) 4.81 (1.13) 4.93 (1.14) 4.76 (1.15) 
Combined SDS Ratings** 404 3.05 (0.76) 3.08 (0.74) 3.19 (0.72) 3.14 (0.78) 
BIAT 205 0.42 (0.47) 0.42 (0.46) 0.41 (0.48) 0.41 (0.46) 
*Overall rating variable created by averaging all ratings (excluding controllability and 
dangerousness) 
**Overall rating variable created by averaging the four SDS ratings 
 
Table 3  
Spearman’s Correlation Matrix among Controllability, Dangerousness, and Combined Ratings 
 General Impressions Controllability Dangerousness 
Dangerousness 0.48* 0.18*                  - 
Controllability 0.33* - - 
*p < 0.01 
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For Hypothesis 3, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship 
between controllability and diagnosis. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: video child 
diagnostic label, motivation, veracity, age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of 
video scripts, and the two-way interactions between diagnostic label and veracity, motivation, 
child age, gender and race, and between motivation and veracity. As random effects, we had 
intercepts for subjects. Model reduction was accomplished using the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC), selecting the model that reduced the BIC by at least 2 (Seltman, 2009). The final 
model included as fixed effects: child diagnostic label, veracity, and motivation, and the two-way 
interaction between diagnostic label and veracity, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 
4). 
 
Table 4  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Controllability, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects** Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 701.20 28.79 < .001 
Motivation 1 697.96 42.66 < .001 
Diagnosis 3 698.28 3.24 .022 
Veracity * Diagnosis 3 906.69 2.62 .050 
* The BIC for the full model was 2769.84. The final model BIC was 2754.61. 
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.33, SE = .04) was significant, Wald Z = 
7.33, p < .001. 
 
There was a main effect of diagnosis, such that children labeled as having depression (M 
= 5.84, SE = 0.07) were rated less in control than children labeled as having asthma (M = 6.05, 
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SE = 0.07), p = .024, and normally developing children (M = 6.02, SE = 0.07), p = .047. There 
was no significant difference in ratings of control between children labeled as having depression 
versus ADHD (M = 5.83, SE = 0.07), p = 0.899, contrary to what was hypothesized. Children 
labeled with ADHD were also rated significantly less in control than children labeled as having 
asthma, p = .017, and normally developing children, p = .034. There was no significant 
difference in ratings of control between children labeled with asthma and normally developing 
children, p = 0.776. 
There were also main effects of veracity and motivation (see Table 4). For veracity, 
children who made truthful statements (M = 6.11, SE = 0.05) were rated as more in control than 
children who told lies (M = 5.76, SE = 0.05), p < .001. In regards to motivation, children who 
made antisocial statements (M = 5.72, SE = 0.05) were rated as less in control than children who 
made prosocial statements (M = 6.15, SE = 0.05), p < .001.  
These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by diagnosis interaction (see 
Table 5). Specifically, children labeled as having ADHD showed a greater decrease in ratings of 
control between true and false statements compared to the normally developing (reference) 
children, t(919) = -2.36, p = .019. Finally, the random effect of subject was significant, 
indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each subject that impact their 
ratings, but were not measured. 
For Hypothesis 4, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis on ratings of 
dangerousness. Following reduction, final model included as fixed effects child diagnostic label, 
veracity, motivation, and child age, and the two-way interaction between veracity and 
motivation, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 6 for model statistics). 
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Table 5  
Means and SEs for Control as a Function of Veracity, Child Gender, and Diagnosis Label 
 Depression ADHD Asthma Control 
Truth 6.04 (.10) 6.16 (.09) 6.13 (.10) 6.12 (.10) 
Lie 5.65 (.10) 5.51 (.10) 5.97 (.10) 5.93 (.09) 
 
Table 6  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Dangerousness, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects** Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 660.74  31.96  < .001  
Motivation 1  657.25 66.83  < .001 
Child age 1  817.19  6.39  .012 
Diagnosis 3  658.51  2.41  .066 
Veracity * Motivation 1 655.68 5.66 .018 
* The BIC for the full model was 3489.48. The final model BIC was 3486.55. 
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 1.10, SE = .14) was significant, Wald Z = 
7.79, p < .001. 
 
Contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for diagnosis. However, 
main effects were found for veracity, child age, and motivation (see Table 6). For veracity, 
children who told lies (M = 4.91, SE = 0.08) were rated as more dangerous than children who 
told truths (M = 5.42, SE = 0.08), p < .001. For child age, older children (M = 5.04, SE = 0.09) 
were rated as more dangerous than younger children (M = 5.29, SE = 0.09), p = .012. In regards 
to motivation, children who made antisocial statements (M = 4.80, SE = 0.08) were rated as more 
dangerous than children who made prosocial statements (M = 5.54, SE = 0.09), p < .001.  
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These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by motivation interaction (see 
Table 7). Specifically, children who made antisocial statements showed a greater decrease in 
perceptions of dangerousness between true and false statements compared to children who made 
prosocial statements, t(656) = -2.38, p = .018. Again, the random effect of subject was 
significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each subject that 
impact their ratings, but were not measured. 
 
Table 7  
Means and SEs for Dangerousness of as a Function of Statement Veracity and Motivation 
 Antisocial Prosocial 
Truth 5.16 (.10) 5.69 (.11) 
Lie 4.44 (.11) 5.39 (.10) 
 
General Impressions (GI) 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 focused on adults’ mean GI ratings of children with mental illness 
labels compared to children without mental illness labels. For Hypothesis 5, we performed a 
linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship between mean GI ratings and the combined 
diagnoses (i.e., mental illness label (depression and ADHD) versus no mental illness label 
(asthma and normally developing)). As fixed effects, we entered into the model: video child 
combined diagnostic label, veracity, motivation, age, gender and race, content of video scripts, 
and order of video scripts, and the two-way interactions between combined diagnostic label and 
veracity, motivation, child age, gender and race, and between motivation and veracity. As 
random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model 
included as fixed effects child combined diagnostic label, veracity, motivation, order of video 
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scripts, and child age, the two-way interaction between veracity and motivation, and the random 
effect of subjects (see Table 8 for model statistics). 
Again, contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for combined 
diagnostic label on mean GI ratings (see Table 8). Main effects were found for child age, 
veracity, order of video scripts, and motivation. For child age, younger children (M = 4.97, SE = 
0.04) were rated more positively than older children (M = 4.77, SE = 0.04), p < .001. For 
veracity, children who told truths (M = 5.47, SE = 0.04) were rated more positively than children 
who told lies (M = 4.29, SE = 0.04), p < .001. The main effect of script order indicated that 
participants who saw the scripts in the third order (M = 4.98, SE = 0.06) rated children more 
positively than participants who saw the scripts in the second order (M = 4.79, SE = 0.06), p = 
.012, but neither differed from the first order (M = 4.87, SE = 0.05). No other order effects 
emerged. In regards to motivation, children who made prosocial statements (M = 5.45, SE = 
0.04) were rated more positively than children who made antisocial statements (M = 4.31, SE = 
0.04), p < .001.  
These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by motivation interaction (see 
Table 9). Antisocial liars were rated most negatively and prosocial truth-tellers most positively, 
with prosocial liars and antisocial truth-tellers rated similarly. Children who made antisocial 
statements showed a greater decrease in overall perceptions between true and false statements 
compared to children who made prosocial statements, t(737) = -3.83, p = < .001. Again, the 
random effect of subject was significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory 




Table 8  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of General Impressions (GI) with Combined Mental Illness 
Diagnoses, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects** Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 742.60 471.28  < .001 
Motivation 1 735.58 435.49  < .001 
Order 2 350.08 3.18 .043 
Child age 1 915.95 14.33 < .001 
Diagnosis combined *** 1 737.83 0.60 .438 
Veracity * Motivation 1 736.58 14.68  < .001 
* The BIC for the full model was 2402.46. The final model BIC was 2387.74. 
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = .09, SE = .03) was significant, Wald Z = 
3.18, p < .001. 
*** Diagnosis combined reflects a comparison between children labeled with mental illness 
(depression and ADHD) versus those without (asthma and normally developing). 
 
Table 9  
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of as a Function of Statement Veracity and 
Motivation, Combined Diagnoses 
 Antisocial Prosocial 
Truth 5.01 (.05) 5.94 (.06) 
Lie 3.61 (.06) 4.96 (.06) 
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For Hypothesis 6, we used linear mixed effects to analyze the relationship between mean 
GI ratings and the individual diagnoses (i.e., depression, ADHD, asthma, normally developing) 
to compare depression versus ADHD. Following BIC reduction, the final model included as 
fixed effects video child diagnostic label, child age, veracity, motivation, and order of video 
scripts, the two-way interaction between veracity and motivation, and the random effect of 
subjects (see Table 10 for final model statistics).  
Again, contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for video child 
diagnostic label on mean GI ratings (see Table 9). However, due to the specific prediction of 
mean GI rating differences between ADHD and depression, the pairwise comparison was also 
examined. It showed a significant difference in mean GI ratings between children labeled with 
ADHD and children labeled with depression, such that children labeled with depression who 
made antisocial statements (M = 4.78, SE = 0.06) were rated more negatively than children 
labeled with ADHD who made antisocial statements (M = 4.94, SE = 0.06), p = .038, as was 
predicted.  
Main effects were found for child age, veracity, order of video scripts, and motivation. 
Younger children (M = 4.99, SE = 0.04) were rated more positively than older children (M = 
4.77, SE = 0.04), p < .001. Children who told truths (M = 5.47, SE = 0.04) were rated more 
positively than children who told lies (M = 4.29, SE = 0.04), p < .001. The main effect of script 
order indicated that participants who saw the scripts in the third order (M = 4.98, SE = 0.06) 
rated children more positively than participants who saw the scripts in the second order (M = 
4.79, SE = 0.06), p = .014, but did not differ from the first order (M = 4.88, SE = 0.05). No other 
order effects emerged. In regards to motivation, children who made prosocial statements (M = 
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5.45, SE = 0.04) were rated more positively than children who made antisocial statements (M = 
4.30, SE = 0.04), p < .001.  
 
Table 10  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of General Impressions (GI), with Individual Diagnoses, Reduced 
Final Model* 
Fixed effects** Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 741.14 471.16 < .001 
Motivation 1 737.50 438.70 < .001 
Order 2 350.00 3.08 .047 
Child age 1 914.62 14.42 < .001 
Diagnosis 3 737.37 1.65 .176 
Veracity * Motivation 1 735.42 14.98 < .001 
* The BIC for the full model was 2418.97. The final model BIC was 2389.96. 
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = .09, SE = .03) was significant, Wald Z = 
3.13, p = .002. 
 
These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by motivation interaction (see 
Table 11). Again, antisocial liars were rated most negatively and prosocial truth-tellers most 
positively, with prosocial liars and antisocial truth-tellers rated similarly. Children who made 
antisocial statements showed a greater decrease in overall perceptions between true and false 
statements compared to children who made prosocial statements, t(735) = -3.87, p = < .001. The 
random effect of subject was again significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory 
variables for each subject that impact their ratings, but were not measured. 
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Table 11  
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of as a Function of Statement Veracity and 
Motivation, Individual Diagnoses 
 Antisocial Prosocial 
Truth 5.00 (.05) 5.94 (.06) 
Lie 3.61 (.06) 4.97 (.06) 
 
Antisocial Statements 
The third set of hypotheses (7-10) focused on differences in adults’ perceptions of and 
punitiveness toward children based on whether their statements were antisocial or prosocial. For 
Hypothesis 7, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship between mean GI 
ratings and statement motivation (i.e., antisocial versus prosocial statements). As fixed effects, 
we entered into the model: video child diagnostic label, age, gender and race, veracity, 
motivation, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the two-way interactions 
between motivation and diagnosis, veracity, child age, gender and race. As random effects, we 
had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects 
veracity, child age, and motivation and the two-way interactions between motivation and child 
age and motivation and veracity, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 12 for model 
statistics). 
As hypothesized, there was a main effect of motivation, such that children who made 
antisocial statements (M = 4.31, SE = 0.04) were rated less positively than children who made 
prosocial statements (M = 5.45, SE = 0.04), p < .001. There were also main effects of veracity 
and child age. Children who made truthful statements (M = 5.47, SE = 0.04) were rated more 
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positively than children who told lies (M = 4.29, SE = 0.04), p < .001. Younger children (M = 
4.98, SE = 0.04) were rated more positively than older children (M = 4.78, SE = 0.04), p < .001. 
 
Table 12  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Motivation and Mean GI Ratings, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects** Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 742.79 470.75 < .001 
Child age 1 916.32 13.52 < .001 
Motivation 1 735.17 440.82 < .001 
Child age * Motivation 1 894.32 5.81 .016 
Veracity * Motivation 1 737.24 15.05 < .001 
* The BIC for the full model was 2421.18. The final model BIC was 2380.60. 
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.10, SE = .03) was significant, Wald Z = 
3.42, p = .001. 
 
These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by motivation interaction (see 
Table 12). Specifically, children who told lies showed a greater increase in mean GI ratings 
between antisocial and prosocial statements compared to children who told truths, t(737) = -3.88, 
p < .001 (see Table 13), with prosocial lies and antisocial truths rated similarly. There was also a 
significant interaction between motivation and child age. Specifically, younger children showed 
a smaller increase in mean GI ratings between antisocial and prosocial statements compared to 
older children, t(894) = 2.41, p = .016 (See Table 13). Finally, the random effect of subject was 
significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each subject that 
impact their ratings, but were not measured. 
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Table 13  
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) as a Function of Veracity, Child Age, and 
Motivation 
 Antisocial Prosocial 
Truth 6.02 (.08) 6.05 (.08) 
Lie 5.49 (.08) 5.96 (.08) 
Younger 5.97 (.08) 6.06 (.09) 
Older 5.55 (.09) 5.95 (.08) 
 
For Hypothesis 8, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship 
between mean GI ratings and video child diagnostic label for the subset of children who told 
antisocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: video child diagnostic label, 
veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the 
two-way interactions between video child diagnostic label and veracity, child age, gender and 
race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model 
included as fixed effects video child diagnostic label, veracity, child age, and the two-way 
interaction between diagnosis and child age, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 14 for 
model statistics). 
Contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for video child diagnostic 
label on mean GI ratings for children who told antisocial truths or lies. However, due to the 
specific prediction of mean GI rating differences between ADHD and depression, the pairwise 
comparison was also examined. It showed a significant difference in mean GI ratings between 
children labeled with ADHD and children labeled with depression, such that children labeled 
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with depression who made antisocial statements (M = 4.18, SE = 0.09) were rated more 
negatively than children labeled with ADHD who made antisocial statements (M = 4.42, SE = 
0.08), p = .032, as was predicted. In addition, there were main effects for veracity and child age. 
For veracity, children who made antisocial truthful statements (M = 4.99, SE = 0.05) were rated 
more positively than children who told antisocial lies (M = 3.60, SE = 0.06), p < .001. Younger 
children (M = 4.46, SE = 0.06) who told antisocial truths or lies were rated more positively than 
older children (M = 4.13, SE = 0.06), p < .001. 
 
Table 14  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings of Antisocial Statements, Individual 
Diagnoses, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects** Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 266.30 324.69 < .001 
Child age 1 470.22 17.17 < .001 
Diagnosis 3 407.16 1.59 .191 
Child age * Diagnosis 3 469.34 3.41 .017 
* The BIC for the full model was 1317.13. The final model BIC was 1304.88. 
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.14, SE = .07) was significant, Wald Z = 
2.04, p = .041. 
 
These main effects were qualified by a significant age by diagnosis interaction (see Table 
15). Specifically, children labeled as having depression who told antisocial truths or lies showed 
an increase in mean GI ratings between younger and older children, with depressed younger 
children rated more negatively than younger control children, whereas the other three reference 
 69 
groups (ADHD, asthma, and normally developing children) showed a decrease in mean GI 
ratings between younger and older children, t(470) = -2.02, p = .044. Finally, the random effect 
of subject was significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each 
subject that impact their ratings, but were not measured. 
 
Table 15  
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of Antisocial Truths and Lies as a Function of 
Individual Diagnosis and Child Age 
 Depression ADHD Asthma Control 
Younger 4.17 (.12) 4.54 (.11) 4.64 (.12) 4.52 (.10) 
Older 4.20 (.12) 4.31 (.10) 3.93 (.12) 4.09 (.12) 
 
For Hypothesis 9, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship 
between mean GI ratings and the combined diagnoses (i.e., mental illness label (depression and 
ADHD) versus no mental illness label (asthma and normally developing)) for the subset of 
children who told antisocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: combined 
child diagnostic label, veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of 
video scripts, and the two-way interactions between combined child diagnostic label and 
veracity, child age, gender and race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. 
Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects combined child diagnostic 
label, veracity, and child age, and the two-way interaction between combined child diagnostic 
label and child age, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 16 for model statistics). 
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Contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for combined child 
diagnostic label on mean GI ratings for children who told antisocial truths or lies. However, there 
were main effects for veracity and child age. For veracity, children who made antisocial truthful 
statements (M = 5.00, SE = 0.05) were rated more positively than children who told antisocial 
lies (M = 3.60, SE = 0.06), p < .001. Younger children (M = 4.47, SE = 0.06) who told antisocial 
truths or lies were rated more positively than older children (M = 4.14, SE = 0.06), p < .001. 
 
Table 16  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings and Combined Diagnoses on Antisocial 
Statements, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects** Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 263.13 334.05 < .001 
Child age 1 473.28 17.14 < .001 
Diagnosis Combined*** 3 377.19 0.13 .722 
Child age * Diagnosis Combined*** 3 485.65 7.70 .006 
* The BIC for the full model was 1314.67. The final model BIC was 1304.70. 
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.15, SE = .07) was significant, Wald Z = 
2.18, p = .029. 
*** Diagnosis combined reflects a comparison between children labeled with mental illness 
(depression and ADHD) versus those without (asthma and normally developing). 
 
These main effects were qualified by a significant age by diagnosis interaction (see Table 
17). Specifically, for younger children who told antisocial truths or lies, GI ratings were more 
positive if they did not have a mental illness label versus having a mental illness label, whereas 
older children had higher mean GI ratings if they did have a mental illness label compared to no 
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mental illness label, t(470) = -2.02, p = .044. Finally, the random effect of subject was 
significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each subject that 
impact their ratings, but were not measured. 
 
Table 17  
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of Antisocial Truths and Lies as a Function of 
Combined Diagnosis and Child Age 
 Mental Illness Label No Mental Illness Label 
Younger 4.37 (.08) 4.57 (.08) 
Older 4.26 (.08) 4.01 (.09) 
 
For Hypothesis 10, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship 
between punitiveness and the combined diagnoses (i.e., mental illness label (depression and 
ADHD) versus no mental illness label (asthma and normally developing)) for the subset of 
children who told antisocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: combined 
child diagnostic label, veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of 
video scripts, and the two-way interactions between combined child diagnostic label and 
veracity, child age, gender and race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. 
Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects combined child diagnostic 
label, veracity, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the random effect of 




Table 18  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Punitiveness and Combined Diagnoses for Antisocial 
Statements, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 484 40.88 < .001 
Order 2 484 26.15 < .001 
Script 3 484 5.69 .001 
Diagnosis Combined** 1 484 1.68 .195 
* The BIC for the full model was 2102.22. The final model BIC was 2098.13. 
** Diagnosis combined reflects a comparison between children labeled with mental illness 
(depression and ADHD) versus those without (asthma and normally developing). 
 
Again, contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for combined child 
diagnostic label on punitiveness. Main effects were found for veracity, order of video scripts, and 
content of video scripts. For veracity, children who told antisocial lies (M = 3.93, SE = 0.14) 
were more likely to be punished than children who told antisocial truths (M = 5.13, SE = 0.12), p 
< .001. The main effect of script order indicated that participants who saw the scripts in the first 
order (M = 3.62, SE = 0.15) were more likely to punish children who told antisocial truths or lies 
than participants who saw the scripts in the second order (M = 4.95, SE = 0.16), p < .001, or third 
order (M = 5.02, SE = 0.16), p < .001. No other order effects emerged. In regards to the main 
effect of script content, participants were less likely to punish children who told antisocial truths 
or lies in the bike script (M = 5.11, SE = 0.18) than children in the party (M = 4.42, SE = 0.17), p 
= .005, sister (M = 4.08, SE = 0.20), p < .001, and teacher (M = 4.51, SE = 0.19), p = .019 scripts. 
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There were no other significant differences in the likelihood of punishment between the other 
scripts and the random effect for subject was not significant. 
Prosocial Statements 
Although no hypotheses were made regarding prosocial statements, in order to more fully 
understand the potential impact of statement motivation, the same analyses in Hypothesis 8 and 
Hypothesis 9 were run for prosocial statements only. As the analysis in Hypothesis 10 focused 
on the likelihood of punishment, which would not be an expected response to prosocial 
statements, that analysis was not conducted.  
As in Hypothesis 8, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship 
between mean GI ratings and video child diagnostic label for the subset of children who told 
prosocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: video child diagnostic label, 
veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the 
two-way interactions between video child diagnostic label and veracity, child age, gender and 
race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model 
included as fixed effects video child diagnostic label and veracity, and the random effect of 
subjects (see Table 19 for model statistics). 
There was no main effect for video child diagnostic label on mean GI ratings for children 
who told prosocial truths or lies. There was a main effect for veracity, such that children who 
made prosocial truthful statements (M = 5.92, SE = 0.06) were rated more positively than 
children who told prosocial lies (M = 4.98, SE = 0.06), p < .001. In addition, the random effect of 
subject was significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each 
subject that impact their ratings, but were not measured. 
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Table 19  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings of Prosocial Statements, Individual 
Diagnoses, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects** Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 204.16 190.07 < .001 
Diagnosis 3 311.40 0.80 .496 
* The BIC for the full model was 1107.52. The final model BIC was 1080.11. 
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.25, SE = .07) was significant, Wald Z = 
3.90, p = < .001. 
 
As in Hypothesis 9, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship 
between mean GI ratings and the combined diagnoses (i.e., mental illness label (depression and 
ADHD) versus no mental illness label (asthma and normally developing)) for the subset of 
children who told prosocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: combined 
child diagnostic label, veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of 
video scripts, and the two-way interactions between combined child diagnostic label and 
veracity, child age, gender and race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. 
Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects video child diagnostic label 
and veracity, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 20 for model statistics). 
There was no main effect for combined video child diagnostic label on mean GI ratings 
for children who told prosocial truths or lies. There was a main effect for veracity, such that 
children who made prosocial truthful statements (M = 5.92, SE = 0.06) were rated more 
positively than children who told prosocial lies (M = 4.98, SE = 0.05), p < .001. In addition, the 
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random effect of subject was significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory 
variables for each subject that impact their ratings, but were not measured. 
 
Table 20  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings of Prosocial Statements, Combined 
Diagnoses, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects** Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 204.30 192.63 < .001 
Diagnosis combined*** 1 278.94 2.31 .130 
* The BIC for the full model was 1096.12. The final model BIC was 1074.86. 
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.26, SE = .06) was significant, Wald Z = 
4.01, p = < .001. 
*** Diagnosis combined reflects a comparison between children labeled with mental illness 
(depression and ADHD) versus those without (asthma and normally developing). 
 
Mental Illness Stigma 
The final two hypotheses focused on the relationship between measurements of mental 
illness stigma and adults’ reactions to children with mental illness labels when they tell truths or 
lies. A smaller sample was used for these analyses, as only 205 participants successfully 
completed the BIAT in a valid manner. To ensure the individuals who completed the BIAT did 
not significantly differ from those who did not, their demographic data was compared. BIAT 
participants ranged in age from 19 to 71 years, with a mean age of 35 years (SD = 10). The BIAT 
sample was 65 percent female (N = 134) and 85 percent white (N = 174). Approximately 57 
percent of the BIAT sample identified as parents (N = 116) and their average level of education 
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was a 2-year college degree. Only gender and race differed, as females were more likely to 
complete the BIAT than males, c2(1, N = 403) = 5.37, p = 0.02, and white participants were 
more likely to complete the BIAT than non-whites, c2(1, N = 403) = 7.03, p < 0.01. 
For Hypothesis 11, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship 
between bias towards mental illness and mean GI ratings for the subset of children who had 
mental illness labels. Bias was categorized as either high (moderate (0.35) or higher D score on 
BIAT and higher than the mean combined SDS score (3.12); N = 252) or low (below 0.35 D 
score on BIAT and below the mean combined SDS score (3.12); N = 126) for each observation 
with both scores available (N = 378). As fixed effects, we entered into the model: overall bias, 
motivation, veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of video 
scripts, and the two-way interactions between overall bias and veracity, motivation, child age, 
gender and race, and between motivation and veracity. As random effects, we had intercepts for 
subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects overall bias, 
veracity, motivation, child gender, and order of video scripts, and the two-way interaction 
between overall bias and child gender, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 21 for model 
statistics). 
As hypothesized, there was a main effect of overall bias, such that participants with low 
levels of implicit and explicit bias (M = 5.24, SE = 0.12) rated children with mental illness labels 
more positively than participants with high levels of implicit and explicit bias (M = 4.54, SE = 
0.09), p < .001. There were also main effects of veracity, motivation, and order. For veracity, 
children with mental illness labels who made truthful statements (M = 5.47, SE = 0.09) were 
rated more positively than children with mental illness labels who told lies (M = 4.31, SE = 
0.10), p < .001. Children with mental illness labels who made prosocial statements (M = 5.37, SE 
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= 0.10) were rated more positively than children with mental illness labels who made antisocial 
statements (M = 4.41, SE = 0.09), p < .001. The main effect of script order indicated that 
participants who saw the scripts in the second order (M = 4.59, SE = 0.12) rated children with 
mental illness labels more negatively than participants who saw the scripts in the first order (M = 
5.09, SE = 0.12), p = .003, or third order (M = 4.99, SE = 0.13), p = .020. No other order effects 
emerged. 
 
Table 21  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings and Mental Illness Bias of Children with 
Mental Illness Labels, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 106.35 88.59 < .001 
Order 2 91.15 5.27 .007 
Motivation 1 80.23 58.87 < .001 
Child gender 1 107.71 3.33 .071 
Overall Bias** 1 91.47 21.77 < .001 
Child gender * Overall Bias 1 112.38 4.38 .039 
* The BIC for the full model was 298.60. The final model BIC was 291.01. 
** The high bias group included participants with both high implicit and explicit bias scores, 
while the low bias group included those with both low implicit and explicit bias scores. 
 
While there was no main effect of gender, the significant main effects were qualified by a 
significant gender by overall bias interaction. Specifically, while high bias individuals did not 
seem to differentiate by child gender, low bias individuals rated male children with mental 
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illness labels more positively than female children with mental illness labels, t(111) = -2.36, p = 
.02 (see Table 22). Finally, the random effect of subject was not significant. 
 
Table 22  
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of Children with Mental Illness Labels as a 
Function of Overall Bias and Child Gender 
 Low Bias High Bias 
Female 4.99 (.17) 4.55 (.11) 
Male 5.50 (.15) 4.52 (.12) 
 
For Hypothesis 12, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship 
between differing levels of implicit and explicit bias towards mental illness and mean GI ratings 
for the subset of children who had mental illness labels. Bias was categorized as either high 
(moderate (0.35) or higher D score on BIAT and higher than the mean combined SDS score 
(3.12); N = 252) or split (moderate (0.35) or higher D score on BIAT and below the mean 
combined SDS score (3.12); N = 416) for each observation with both scores available (N = 668). 
As fixed effects, we entered into the model: bias category, motivation, veracity, child age, gender 
and race, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the two-way interactions 
between bias category and veracity, motivation, child age, gender and race, and between 
motivation and veracity. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC 
reduction, the final model included as fixed effects bias category, veracity, and motivation, and 
the random effect of subjects (see Table 23 for model statistics). 
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Table 23  
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings and Mental Illness Bias Category of Children 
with Mental Illness Labels, Reduced Final Model* 
Fixed effects Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Veracity 1 129.11 130.75 < .001 
Motivation 1 111.54 50.23 < .001 
Bias Category** 1 140.67 44.94 < .001 
* The BIC for the full model was 322.33. The final model BIC was 310.77. 
** The high bias group included participants with both high implicit and explicit bias scores, 
while the split bias group included those with high implicit and low explicit bias scores. 
 
As hypothesized, there was a main effect of bias category, such that participants with 
high levels of implicit and explicit bias (M = 4.45, SE = 0.08) rated children with mental illness 
labels more negatively than participants with high levels of implicit bias and low levels of 
explicit bias (M = 5.28, SE = 0.09), p < .001. There were also main effects of veracity and 
motivation. For veracity, children with mental illness labels who made truthful statements (M = 
5.48, SE = 0.07) were rated more positively than children with mental illness labels who told lies 
(M = 4.25, SE = 0.09), p < .001. Children with mental illness labels who made prosocial 
statements (M = 5.26, SE = 0.08) were rated more positively than children with mental illness 
labels who made antisocial statements (M = 4.47, SE = 0.09), p < .001. Finally, the random effect 





The current study examined adults’ reactions to children with and without mental illness 
labels after they told antisocial and prosocial truths and lies. In doing so, it took the first step 
towards evaluating a proposed model of how mental illness stigma might impact the 
socialization process of truth- and lie-telling for children with mental illness labels (see Figure 
2). Specifically, the current study attempted to evaluate the proposed link between mental illness 
labels and perceptions of dangerousness and controllability, as well as the nature of a statement 
(i.e., prosocial versus antisocial; truth versus lie) on perceptions of and reactions to (i.e., the 
likelihood to punish) the stigmatized child speakers.  
Overall, the results of this study revealed fewer differences than hypothesized in adults’ 
perceptions of children with and without mental illness labels who told truths and lies. Notably, 
while participants did perceive children with mental illness labels to be more “out of control” 
than children without mental illness labels, this was equally true for both ADHD and depression. 
However, children labeled with ADHD who told lies were rated significantly lower on control 
than the other three child label groups (i.e., depression, asthma, and reference/normally 
developing). This may suggest that stereotypes about children with ADHD (i.e., being “out of 
control”) are activated when a child perceived to have the diagnosis engages in socially 
undesirable behavior (i.e., lying) (Corrigan, 2000; Pescosolido, 2013).  
In contrast, while the main effect of diagnosis on overall participant general impressions 
was not significant, participants’ ratings of children labeled with depression who made antisocial 
statements were significantly lower (i.e., less positive) than children labeled with ADHD who 
made antisocial statements. This was particularly true for younger children labeled with 
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depression who made antisocial statements, who were rated significantly lower than any other 
age/diagnosis group. This result is consistent with prior studies’ findings of increased adult 
concerns surrounding dangerousness or violence in children with depression (Corrigan et al., 
2003; Perry et al., 2007; Pescosolido et al., 2007). Similar to the relationship between ADHD 
and control above, the absence of main or interaction effects of diagnosis on participant ratings 
of dangerousness across all statement types may be due to needing the child to perform a socially 
undesirable behavior (i.e., telling an antisocial lie) before the participants’ underlying stereotypes 
about children with depression are triggered.  
Consequently, while the results of this study do provide some support for the relationship 
between perceptions of control and dangerousness and mental illness stigma found in prior 
studies, the exact mechanism that drives the expected outcomes (i.e., discriminatory or helping 
behaviors) may be different for children than for adults. Perhaps children are perceived as less 
responsible for their own mental illness labels, and as more likely to be “cured” than adults, 
which could impact reactions to children with those labels. For instance, participants did not 
differentiate by diagnosis whether they would punish children’s antisocial truths or lies, 
suggesting that perhaps they would treat the behavior consistently across diagnostic categories 
(at least in the types of antisocial contexts studied here). Future studies should investigate other 
potential factors related to dangerousness and control that may be more aligned with adults’ 
perceptions of children.  
Interestingly, younger children who made antisocial statements were perceived more 
negatively when they had a mental illness label than when they did not have a mental illness 
label. In contrast, older children who made antisocial statements were perceived more negatively 
when they did not have a mental illness label than when they did have a mental illness label. 
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Notably, this interaction between age and mental illness label was not present for prosocial 
statements. This suggests that the process by which adults adjust their perceptions of children’s 
behavior may change as children age, particularly surrounding antisocial behaviors, consistent 
with research showing that parents might adapt their expectations and messages around lie-
telling as a function of child age (Lavioe et al., 2016). Hence, it may be that the proposed model 
needs to be adjusted depending on the child’s age, with younger children encountering a specific 
form of mental illness stigma not encountered by older children or adults. For instance, mental 
illness identified at an earlier age might be perceived as more severe and thus more problematic 
in younger than in older children, provoking a more negative response for younger children. In 
contrast, perhaps older children are considered less remediable and their misdeeds more 
predictable, thus eliciting weaker reactions from observers who might not perceive much 
opportunity for change among older children. As this result has not been seen previously in the 
literature, future studies should further explore the strength and mechanism underlying the result.  
However, it is important to note that the lack of significant results related to diagnosis 
may be due factors unrelated to the sufficiency of the model. It is possible that the participants in 
this study did not consider the child’s mental illness label in deciding their ratings because they 
believed that the mental illness label had no relevance to their perception of the child (i.e., no 
stigma about mental illness). Alternatively, the participants may not have truly believed the 
mental illness label assigned to the child due to the lack of congruence between the child’s 
behavior and the label. Recall that the same child actors’ statements were characterized 
differently using the written vignettes to create the conditions, which was how diagnostic 
categories were indicated as well. Hence the video depictions did not differ as a function of 
diagnostic category. As a result, participants may have not used the label information in their 
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determination of the ratings, relying instead on their perceptions from the videotapes, which 
depicted ostensibly normal child actors.  
Nevertheless, there were several findings that are consistent with the literature and 
provide support for the validity of the overall study design. Children who were seen as more 
dangerous and more “out of control” were rated less positively than children seen as harmless or 
“in control” (Martin et al., 2000; Perry et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2008). Furthermore, children 
who told lies and children who made antisocial statements were perceived as more dangerous 
than children who told truths and children who made prosocial statements (Talwar & Crossman, 
2011; Talwar et al., 2007). Children who told antisocial lies were seen as particularly dangerous 
by participants. Similarly, children who told truths and made prosocial statements were seen as 
more in control than children who told lies or made antisocial statements (Peterson, Peterson, & 
Seeto, 1983; Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Finally, children who told antisocial lies were 
perceived most negatively overall. Prosocial truth-tellers were rated most positively, followed by 
antisocial truth-tellers, then prosocial liars, who were all perceived at somewhat similar rates, 
higher than antisocial lie-tellers. Hence, although liars made a worse impression than truth-
tellers, the lie motivation mattered, reinforcing and replicating the importance of motivational 
context in perceptions of lie-telling (Talwar & Crossman, 2011).   
Also consistent with the literature were the results regarding the relationship between 
explicit and implicit biases against mental illness and perceptions of children with mental illness. 
As found in prior studies, participants with high explicit and implicit biases against mental 
illness rated children with mental illness labels more negatively than participants with low 
implicit and explicit biases (Pescosolido, 2013; Teachman et al., 2006). In addition, participants 
with low explicit biases and high implicit biases (a pattern typically seen in those who respond 
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based on perceived social desirability) generally rated children with mental illness labels more 
positively than those with high explicit and implicit biases (Pescosolido, 2013; Teachman et al., 
2006).  
However, it is notable that only participants with low explicit and implicit biases had a 
significant difference in their ratings of male and female children with mental illness labels, such 
that males were rated more positively than females (though both higher than ratings by 
participants with high biases). In understanding this result it is important to note that having a 
negative stereotype about children with mental illness labels is not necessarily the same as 
engaging in discriminatory behaviors towards children with mental illness labels (Corrigan, 
2004; Pescosolido, 2013). For example, while a participant might have low bias towards children 
with mental illness labels, they may still believe, consciously or unconsciously, negative 
stereotypes surrounding children with mental illness labels (i.e., boys with ADHD are “out of 
control”; boys with depression are “violent”) (Martin et al., 2000; Perry et al., 2007; Walker et 
al., 2008). As such, it is possible this result is due to participants’ negative stereotype 
expectations regarding the child’s behavior being violated in a good way (i.e., they expected a 
male child with ADHD or depression to present with worse behavior than depicted in the study) 
and thus rated males much more highly as a result. 
It is worth noting that it is possible that the lack of significant findings regarding 
diagnostic label was partially driven by the social desirability bias, indicated by different 
findings when ratings of those with split biases were examined. It was unfortunate that so few of 
the participants completed the BIAT, which was intended to account precisely for this concern. 
Perhaps an in-person, versus online survey that relied on a separate program, would have better 
success gathering more complete data. Future studies will need to consider ways to either 
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increase participant retention and accuracy on the BIAT or minimize the impact of the social 
desirability bias. 
Interestingly, there was also a lack of significant findings concerning the race of the child 
in the video. As there is a well-established bias against minority children, particularly young 
black teens, it is surprising that race did not appear to have a significant impact on outcome 
(Seaton, Caldwell, Sellers, & Jackson, 2008; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998). This is 
particularly surprising given that study participants predominately self-identified as white. 
However, the sample is likely more diverse than it appears because Hispanic was inadvertently 
omitted as a demographic self-identification option. The lack of significant findings may be due, 
instead, to the non-white children in the videos appearing predominantly Hispanic. Of the older 
children featured in the videos, only one child was clearly a black male. It is possible that with a 
larger sample of black males (and females), race would have a significant impact on outcomes. 
Future studies should make an effort to specifically examine potential racial differences in 
outcomes. 
Finally, it is also worth noting that there were several significant effects of the order of 
the videos and the content of the scripts on participant ratings. In general, children who made 
antisocial statements associated with the bike script were less likely to be punished than children 
who made antisocial statements associated with any other script. Children who made antisocial 
statements were more likely to be punished if the participants saw the scripts in the first order 
(i.e., bike, party, sister, teacher) than the other two orders. Order effect was also significant when  
looking at the overall ratings of children with mental illness – participants who saw the scripts in 
the second order (i.e., teacher, sister, party, bike) rated children with mental illness labels more 
negatively than participants in the other two orders. When looking at the overall sample, 
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participants who saw the scripts in order 3 (i.e., sister, bike, teacher, party) rated children more 
positively than participants in the other two orders. While it is unclear why these differences 
exist, it is important to note them as they introduce unwanted variance in the results. Future 
studies should examine ways to eliminate or reduce the effect of script order and content on 
participant responses in order to enhance the ability to see the impact of the desired independent 
variables.  
Limitations 
Despite this study’s many strengths, there are several limitations that must also be 
acknowledged. Notably, the participants for this study were recruited through Amazon’s Mturk 
service. While this service has been widely used in academia due to the ability to quickly obtain 
data from a more diverse sample than typically seen in college student populations, its 
drawbacks have also been discussed at length. Most frequently mentioned are the inconsistent 
quality of the responses, the difficulty ascertaining that the participants meet the study’s criteria, 
not being able to control the environment in which the participant is completing the study, and 
the overall level of attention that the participant is giving the study (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016; 
Stritch, Pedersen, & Taggart, 2017).  
These potential issues were at least partially addressed in this study through manipulation 
and attention checks but could have nevertheless had a significant impact on the quality of the 
data obtained. For example, a number of ratings were dropped because participants incorrectly 
identified the video child’s diagnostic category, veracity or motivation. While this could have 
been due to inattention (particularly for diagnostic label or veracity), it could also have reflected 
a different interpretation of the child’s intent, for motivation. For instance, while a child might 
have been described as telling a prosocial lie because the statement would spare a parent’s 
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feelings, a rater could have interpreted the intention as being self-serving, so the child would 
avoid angering that parent. Identifying purely antisocial versus prosocial motivations in lie-
telling is not exact and thus mixed perceptions would not be surprising.  
In addition, this study used child actors to create the videos presented to the participants. 
It is possible that the quality of the child’s acting, a child’s personal characteristics, or the 
incongruence between the assigned mental illness label and the child’s presentation may have 
impacted participant responses in unintended ways. Efforts to limit the impact individual child 
characteristics could have on the results were taken through the use of randomization. However, 
this may have not entirely eliminated the potential impact on the results from these 
characteristics, as suggested by the emergence of some order effects.    
Finally, because the study examined reactions to videotaped actors, it remains to be seen 
how individuals faced with actual children lying or telling the truth would respond in the 
moment. Parents who are faced with their children’s lie-telling report different responses as a 
function of child age and indicate different tolerance for lies as a function of motivation (Lavoie 
et al., 2015). However, it is unclear how they might respond and socialize their child’s behavior 
as a function of child diagnosis. Moreover, it is possible that children who have mental health 
struggles have parents with similar or related conditions that could alter the socialization those 
children receive with regard to truth- and lie-telling. Future research should include questions 
regarding the mental health history of participants to further understanding of this potential 
relationship. While it seems clear that children who lie tend to also engage in other antisocial 
behaviors (Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986), the role of mental health labels and socialization in this 
relation remains to be elaborated.  
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Nevertheless, this study is the first to examine mental health labels in the context of 
individuals’ responses to lie- and truth-telling for antisocial and prosocial motivations. It 
contributes to the burgeoning literature examining potential social influences on children’s 
learning of the social rules around truth- and lie-telling in their cultures. Future research will help 
to illuminate how social messages about honesty might be communicated to children and the role 
that various forms of stigma might play in these messages. 
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APPENDIX A: VIGNETTES 
Depressed Vignette: 
Casey’s doctor determined that Casey is depressed. In the last few months, Casey has been 
increasingly moody and seems to have lost interest in favorite hobbies and in spending time with 
friends. Casey always feels very tired, despite sleeping more than normal, and doesn't feel like 
eating. Casey has been having trouble concentrating in school and at home, received poor grades 
in most classes, and has said, "I wish I hadn't been born." Casey’s school reported that Casey has 
been withdrawing from classmates and spends free periods alone. One of Casey's friends has also 
heard Casey talk about committing suicide. Casey is not yet receiving treatment for 
depression. Recently, Casey had the conversation you are about to see.  
 
ADHD Vignette: 
Jessie’s doctor determined that Jessie has Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD). Jessie has always had trouble in school, especially in completing assignments on time. 
Jessie's teachers note that Jessie is very distractible, and that they often have to remind Jessie to 
get back to work. Jessie often stands up, walks around the classroom, looks out the window, or 
talks to classmates. Jessie’s parents notice that Jessie often forgets to complete tasks, has trouble 
getting up in the morning and going to bed at night, and often loses things. Jessie also has 
difficulty making and keeping friends. Jessie is not yet receiving treatment for ADHD. Recently, 
Jessie had the conversation you are about to see. 
  
Asthma Vignette: 
Avery’s doctor determined that Avery has asthma. Avery has a history of breathing problems. 
Avery often has bouts of coughing at night and doesn't sleep very well. Avery’s parents and 
teachers have noticed that these problems seem to be particularly bad in the spring and fall, 
during strenuous sports activities, and during challenging situations. Avery used to enjoy playing 
soccer, but recently gave it up because of these problems. Avery feels badly about having 
breathing problems, which seem to be getting worse, and has said, "I wish I could be just like 
other kids." Avery is involved in several hobbies, including art and music, and shares these 
activities with several friends. Avery is not yet receiving treatment for asthma. Recently, Avery 
had the conversation you are about to see. 
 
Control Vignette: 
Riley’s doctor determined that Riley is on track and developing normally. Riley has several 
friends in the neighborhood and gets together with them one or two times per week. Riley is also 
involved in several hobbies, including sports and music. Riley usually gets along fairly well with 
other kids, but occasionally has some problems with needing to be in control or go first in games. 
Riley does well and behaves appropriately at school, although Riley tends to be somewhat shy 
about participating in class. Riley's parents note that Riley is sometimes moody, but this comes 
and goes. Riley is experiencing healthy development. Recently, Riley had the conversation you 
are about to see.  
	  
 90 
APPENDIX B: VIDEO SCRIPTS 
Scenario 1 
Parent asks: “Have you seen your sister?  She is in BIG trouble!” 
 
Ground truth A: Child knows parent will reward the sister for going to the library to do 
homework. Child also knows sister is hiding under the porch to avoid punishment for punching 
the child earlier and would like to get revenge.  
 
Child says:  
Answer 1: “She went to the library to do homework.” (prosocial lie) 
Answer 2: “She’s hiding under the porch.” (antisocial truth) 
 
Ground truth B: Child knows sister was stung by a bee and might be having a serious allergic 
reaction. Child also knows sister is hiding under the porch to avoid punishment and doesn’t have 
her emergency medicine with her. 
 
Child says:  
Answer 1: “She went to the library to do homework.” (antisocial lie) 
Answer 2: “She’s hiding under the porch.” (prosocial truth) 
 
Scenario 2 
Parent asks: “What happened to your new bike?”   
 
Ground truth A: Child knows brother accidentally crashed the bike and destroyed it. Child 
promised brother he/she wouldn’t tell their parents. However, child’s parents will only give 
him/her brother’s new bike, which child really wants, if child tells the truth.  
 
Child says:  
Answer 1: “I loaned it to my brother... but it was like this before.” (prosocial lie) 
Answer 2: “I loaned it to my brother and he crashed it... he destroyed it!” (antisocial 
truth) 
 
Ground truth B: Child knows his/her brother crashed the bike into another kid's bike, destroying 
both bikes. Their parents would buy child a new bike, but they only have enough money to buy 
one bike. If they find out brother crashed the bike, they will give the new bike to the other kid.  
 
Child says:  
Answer 1: “I loaned it to my brother... but it was like this before.” (antisocial lie) 
Answer 2: “I loaned it to my brother and he crashed it... he destroyed it!” (prosocial truth)  
 
Scenario 3 
Parent (mom/step-mom) asks: "Did you enjoy your party?" 
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Ground truth A: Child had a great time at the party.  But child hates his/her new step-mom, who 
worked very hard to plan the party to make the child happy. Child knows he/she will get extra 
presents if he/she tells step-mom he/she hated the party. 
 
Child says:  
Answer 1: "No... It was so boring!" (antisocial lie) 
Answer 2: “Yes... it was the most fun party ever!” (prosocial truth) 
 
Ground truth B: Child’s parents are divorced. Child had a great time at the party his/her dad 
threw for him/her. Child knows his/her mom would be very sad and jealous to hear about his/her 
great time, but would buy child more presents.  
 
Child says:  
Answer 1: "No... It was so boring!" (prosocial lie) 
Answer 2: “Yes... it was the most fun party ever!” (antisocial truth) 
 
Scenario 4 
Parent asks: “How do you like your teacher this year?” 
 
Ground truth A: Child thinks teacher is a horrible person. Teacher is really mean to everyone 
except for him/her, because his/her mother is the school principal. Child never has to do 
homework and always gets an A on tests, even when he/she gets most of the questions wrong. 
Child knows his/her mother will fire the teacher if she complains and hire a new teacher who 
will treat everyone fairly.  
 
Child says:  
Answer 1: “She's a horrible person!” (prosocial truth) 
Answer 2: “She's the nicest teacher I’ve ever had!” (antisocial lie) 
 
Ground truth B: Child thinks the teacher is a horrible person. Teacher keeps giving the child 
detention for talking in class and won’t let him/her sit next to his/her best friend. Child’s mother 
is the school principal, and child knows that if he/she complains his/her teacher would get fired. 
 
Child says:  
Answer 1: “She's a horrible person!” (antisocial truth) 
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